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THE REGULATORY TREATMENT OF MISTAKES IN
RETROSPECT: CANCELED PLANTS AND EXCESS
CAPACITY
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.t
In the 1970's, firms in the energy industry concluded that they had
a duty both to the public and to their stockholders to make investments
in large new facilities, such as nuclear generating plants, plants to con-
vert coal into pipeline-quality synthetic gas, terminals to receive and
regasify imported liquefied natural gas, and pipelines to transport nat-
ural gas from frontier areas. With substantial encouragement from both
federal and state governments,1 they committed billions of dollars to
projects with lead times of eight to twelve years.2
Today, a high proportion of the large energy projects initiated in
the 1970's have been canceled,$ and many recently completed or nearly
completed plants are the subject of intense controversy. Regulatory
agencies throughout the country are being confronted with requests for
enormous rate increases to recover hundreds of millions of dollars in-
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1 The need to invest in a wide range of capital intensive energy supply projects
has been repeatedly emphasized in major presidential addresses. See, e.g., SEN. COMM.
ON ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., ExECUTIVE ENERGY Docu-
MENTS (Comm. Print 1978); SEN. COMM. ON INT'L & INSULAR AFFAIRS, 93RD
CONG., 1ST SESS., PRESIDENTIAL ENERGY STATEMENTS (Comm. Print 1973). Presi-
dent Reagan has continued the trend initiated by his predecessors. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY, REDUCING U.S. OIL VULNERABILITY, ENERGY POLICIES FOR THE
1980's, at 1-2, 6, 14 (1980).
2 See 2 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PROJECTED
COSTS OF ELECTRICITY FROM NUCLEAR AND COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS 1, 41 n.9
(1982) [hereinafter cited as COSTS OF ELECTRICITY]; see also U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
IMPACTS OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 38
(1982) (construction lead times of 7-9 years for coal plants and 11-13 years for nuclear
plants).
In 1980, in fact, allowance for funds used during construction accounted for 55%
of the utility industry's average earnings per share. The Future of the Nation's Energy
Utilities: Implications for Federal R.D. & D., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on En-
ergy Development & Applications of the House Comm. on Science & Technology, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (Comm. Print 1982) (statement of Charles Benore, vice president of
Paine, Webber, Mitchell & Hutchins).
3 See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR PLANT
CANCELLATIONS: CAUSES, COSTS, AND CONSEQUENCES xviii table ES2, xxi table ES4
(1983) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS].
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vested in projects that have recently been canceled or abandoned 4 and to
reflect multi-billion dollar investments in projects that are either re-
cently completed or are nearing completion.5 In the most extreme cases,
the resolution of the legal disputes spawned by major new energy
projects could result in the bankruptcy of the sponsoring entity or the
municipalities it serves.' State and federal regulatory agencies have had
little luck in resolving these highly politicized controversies through ap-
plication of traditional doctrines of public utility regulation.
This Article will explore the major legal and policy issues
presented by capital intensive energy projects that appear in retrospect
to have been mistakes, projects that would not have been initiated ten
years ago if the sponsors had known then what they know today. Such
projects will be referred to in this Article as "mistakes in retrospect."
Most of the discussion will focus on nuclear generating plants because
they dominate this category of projects. Over one hundred nuclear units
have been canceled, and many other such units are only now nearing
completion.' Investments of approximately ten billion dollars have al-
ready been lost as a result of nuclear plant cancellations,9 and future
cancellations are expected to involve additional sunk costs of five to
4 See generally id.
' See, e.g., Application of Louisiana Power & Light Co. for an Increase in its
Rates, Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n Docket No. U-15684 (Jan. 25, 1983) (utility
requested increases in rates that would produce nearly $412 million of additional net
revenue to help offset the cost of constructing a nuclear power plant where cost was
estimated at $2.1 billion and cost would probably increase before completion); Applica-
tion of New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., for an Increase in its Rates, Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Docket No. U-15689 (Jan. 28, 1983) (utility requested increases in rates that
would generate nearly $113 million of additional initial cash revenue annually in order
to recover, among other items, purchase power expenses associated with the Grand
Gulf nuclear power plant). Both applications are on file at the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review.
' Bankruptcy threatens Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) in
the aftermath of its default on a $2.25 billion bond series issued to construct two nu-
clear power plants. The default has, moreover, seriously undermined the financial~sta-
bility of 88 municipalities in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho that have invested heavily
in three other partially completed plants being built by WPPSS. See Asson v. City of
Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 670 P.2d 839 (1983); Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub.
Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983); Washington Supply System
Defaults, Creating Uncertainties for Northwest, 11 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 757,
757-58 (July 28, 1983) [hereinafter cited as WPPSS Default]; WPPSS Bond Ruling
Threatens Financing in Northwest Region, Wall St. J., June 17, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
7 See NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 4; U.S.: 77% of Reac-
tors Cost Twice the Estimates, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 18, 1984, at ID, col. 2 (100 reactors
canceled since 1974).
1 See NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 5 table 1. The next
wave of cancellations could be of plants much further along in the construction process.
See Powerless Feeling Utilities Face a Crisis Over Nuclear Plants; Costs, Delays
Mount, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Powerless Utilities].
9 NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 36 table 9.
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eight billion dollars. 10 In addition, many of the recently completed or
soon-to-be completed plants represent scores of billions of dollars"1
wasted on what now appears to be totally superfluous generating ca-
pacity. Although nuclear power plants account for the great majority of
costly mistakes, other areas of the energy industry have had their share
of expensive failures. Witness, for example, the recently abandoned liq-
uefied natural gas terminal in Cove Point, Maryland,12 the coal gasifi-
cation plant nearing completion in North Dakota,"3 and the liquefied
natural gas terminal that began operations in 1983 in Lake Charles,
Louisiana.14 The question of how to deal with the financial problems
created by ill-advised investments in nuclear plants and other major
energy projects is the most troublesome problem facing regulatory
agencies today.
Part I of this Article sketches the historical background of the
problem by contrasting the expectations of the 1970's with present con-
ditions and predicted future conditions. Part II is a description of the
major questions presented to regulatory agencies and the range of solu-
tions attempted to date. Part III compares the economic consequences
when major capital investments prove failures in competitive markets
with the treatment such investments receive in traditional public utility
regulation and considers what light the comparison throws on the
proper course for regulation in the future. Part IV is a search for an-
swers to the particular questions confronted by regulatory agencies in
connection with investments that appear to be mistakes in retrospect.
Finally, part V includes a discussion of the broader inferences to be
drawn from the present regulatory morass.
The conclusions of this study are several. First, to an uncertain
degree, the regulatory process itself sometimes creates an incentive to
overinvest in assets. Second, the correct regulatory treatment of mis-
takes in retrospect would seem to involve both counteracting this incen-
tive by preventing utilities' recovery of the costs associated with plants
built in response to this incentive and creating incentives for correct
10 Id. at 64 table 15; see also Deepening of Nuclear Woes: 2 Actions Stun Indus-
try, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1984, at D1, col. 3.
"I Electric utilities had $47.5 billion invested in partially completed nuclear plants
in 1982. This represents nearly 70% of all construction work in progress (CWIP). See
2 COSTS OF ELECTRICITY, supra note 2, at 41 n.9.
12 See FERC Wants Owners to Show Cause Why Two LNG Facilities Shouldn't
Be Abandoned, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Aug. 1, 1983, at 5.
13 See Lower Oil Prices Cloud Loan Repayment for Great Plains, Consortium
Tells DOE, 11 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 444 (Apr. 7, 1983).
14 See FERC Orders Trunkline LNG to Show Cause Why Its Certificate Relating
to Algerian LNG Import Project Should Not Be Revoked for Failure to Renegotiate the
Contract Price, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REP., July 21, 1983, at 8.
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forecasting and decisionmaking similar to those present in an unregu-
lated market. Third, the difficulty of quantifying the effect of the incen-
tive to overinvest means that regulatory agencies will, at best, be relying
on approximation, and the nature of regulation itself precludes the
adoption of pure "market incentives" for correct forecasting.15 Fourth,
new plants designed to serve several regulatory jurisdictions offer sig-
nificant opportunities to improve the operation of the industry in the
future. Yet, the present regulatory system discourages this socially de-
sirable option. A new regulatory structure should be created specifically
to permit construction of multijurisdiction plants. Fifth, because mis-
takes in retrospect derive at least in part from flaws in the regulatory
system and because the impediments to correcting the problems are also
rooted in the system, it may be time to reconsider the arguments against
deregulation of electric generation in light of the problems created by
mistakes in retrospect.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A first step in addressing any policy issue is to understand its gen-
esis. The nuclear generating plants that are now causing such problems
for the regulatory system were initiated in the early and mid-1970's.
The reasoning upon which utilities and public power suppliers based
those crucial decisions can be reconstructed by reviewing the forecasts
of future conditions that were produced by respected experts in both the
public and private sectors and heavily relied upon in planning. There
were then, as there are today, differences of opinion among knowledge-
able specialists in energy economics, but the majority of forecasts pub-
lished by industry and the federal government agreed on several critical
decisionmaking parameters.
A. The Forecasts of the 1970's
In the early 1970's, there were a number of forecasts that played a
major part in the decision to build plants that now seem to have been
ill-considered. First, demand for electricity was expected to increase by
approximately seven percent annually for the foreseeable future.16 This
demand forecast meant that the typical electric utility had to be pre-
pared to supply almost twice as much electricity in the early 1980's as
it was supplying in the early 1970's. The forecast of steadily increasing
demand played a crucial role in decisions to commit large amounts of
15 See infra text accompanying notes 167-90.
e NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 7, 16 table 5.
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capital to new plants."'
Second, in the mid-1970's, most forecasters predicted that new nu-
clear plants would cost substantially less to operate than existing oil-
and gas-fired plants."" The oil price shock of 1973 to 1974 and the
increasingly severe shortage of natural gas from domestic sources led to
forecasts that oil and gas prices would escalate for the foreseeable fu-
ture at a rate far above the general inflation rate. 9 Oil and gas, more-
over, were characterized as "insecure fuels" whose continued use to
generate electricity would be harmful to the national interest. Reliance
upon oil could endanger the nation by increasing its dependence upon
the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) and thereby exposing the United States to the threat of future
embargoes and international strife.20 Use of natural gas to generate
electricity would harm the nation by aggravating the already severe
shortage of natural gas, thus jeopardizing the future availability of gas
for residential, commercial, industrial feedstock, and industrial process
uses. 2 1 Electricity generated in nuclear power plants (and coal-fired
plants) was expected to cost substantially less than electricity generated
17 See id. at 7, 11-15 table 4. Table 4 shows that lower forecasted load growth
played a part in a significant number of decisions to cancel nuclear plants.
18 See id. at 28.
19 See SEN. COMM. ON ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
ENERGY: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 212-329 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as
UNCERTAIN FUTURE]; see also U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., PROMOTING EFFICIENCY
IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY SECTOR 22 (1982) (oil and natural gas prices assumed to
escalate at a rate four percent faster than the rate of overall inflation).
The increasing price of oil and natural gas and the decreasing supply of both
made the use of nuclear plants far more attractive. In 1973 and 1974, during the height
of the Arab oil embargo, some forecasts indicated that by the year 2000 nuclear power
would supply as much as 2,000 gigawatts of electrical generating capacity. These esti-
mates were quickly replaced by far more conservative ones. See SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY
& POWER OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS., U.S. ENERGY DEMAND AND SUPPLY 1976-1985, LIMITED OPTIONS,
UNLIMITED CONSTRAINTS 70-71 (Comm. Print 1978).
20 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at 10-11 (outlining the possi-
ble dangers of continued reliance on oil produced in the Persian Gulf area).
21 For evidence that periodic, severe natural gas shortages were taken as a given,
see, for example, 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1983). This regulation provides priority-of-service
categories for the utilization and development of natural gas. Residential and small-
volume commercial users are given highest priority. Id. § 2.78(a)(1)(i). The next high-
est priority is given to large commercial requirements, firm industrial requirements for
plant protection, feedstock and process needs, and pipeline customer storage injection
requirements. Id. § 2.78(a)(1)(ii). The regulation sets forth a total of nine priority-of-
service categories applicable to natural gas deliveries made by pipeline companies dur-
ing periods of curtailed deliveries. See id. § 2.78(a)(1).
This regulation codified Federal Power Commission actions, which had been
based upon recognition of "the critical shortage of natural gas supply and its effect on
this Nation's progress." FPC Order No. 467, UTIL. L. REP. FPC Orders 1935-1973
(CCH) 1 5477 (1973).
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in oil- and gas-fired plants and yet involve none of the supply security
problems associated with oil and gas.22
This second forecast-that the nuclear generation would for the
forseeable future be less expensive and more secure-was significant to
utility decisionmakers for two reasons. First, this projection suggested
that any new power plants needed either to meet expected increases in
demand or to replace obsolete plants should be designed to burn a fuel
other than oil or gas; this translated, as a practical matter, into a deter-
mination that all new plants should be coal or nuclear." Most utilities
chose a mix of coal and nuclear plants.2 Second, the predicted cost
differential between electricity generated with oil and gas and electricity
generated with coal and nuclear fuel was so great that it suggested util-
ities should retire oil- and gas-fired plants prematurely and replace
them with coal and nuclear plants.
2 5
Thus, in the early 1970's, electric utilities had numerous reasons
to believe that they were serving the interests of society by initiating the
construction of hundreds of new nuclear power plants. Reliance on
forecasts of 'future demand for electricity and of the future availability
and cost of alternative fuels allowed utilities reasonably to conclude that
these new plants would decrease electricity rates, while simultaneously
furthering the national policies of reducing dependence on imported oil
and ameliorating the shortage of natural gas.
B. The Reality of the 1970's and Early 1980's
History has not confirmed the accuracy of the forecasts of the
1970's. Each of the critical items on which general consensus existed in
the 1970's is subject to serious dispute today.
Demand for electricity has not increased at nearly the seven per-
cent annual rate forecast. Between 1973 and 1981, electricity demand
increased at an average annual rate of less than three percent,26 and in
1982 it actually decreased by over two percent. 7 In short, less than half
2 NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 28.
'3 Indeed, Congress prohibited the use of "natural gas or petroleum as a primary
energy source in any new electric powerplant" constructed or reconstructed after No-
vember 1978. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92
Stat. 3298 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8311 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). See generally Sym-
posium: The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act of 1978, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 297
(1981).
2 See 1 COSTS OF ELECTRICITY, supra note 2, at 18 figure 1, 28-29, 32 figure 4.
25 See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE NATIONAL ELECTRIC RELIABILITY STUDY:
FINAL REPORT (1981).
28 Studness, Electric Demand and the Nation's Energy Consumption, 111 PUB.
UTIL. FORT., June 9, 1983, at 54.
27 Johnson, Why Electric Power Growth Will Not Resume, 111 PUB. UTIL.
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the increased demand for electricity expected by this time has material-
ized. As a result, most utilities today have substantial excess capacity,2"
and many of the plants that were initiated to meet expected increases in
demand can no longer be justified solely on that basis. 9
The oil market also has not behaved in the manner forecast in the
1970's. Oil prices increased dramatically in 1973 and 1974,30 but this
rapid increase was followed by a period of five years in which oil prices
were relatively constant."' A second dramatic increase occurred in
1979.32 After reaching a peak in 1981, crude oil prices have declined
substantially, 3 a worldwide oil glut has developed, and the continuing
vitality of the OPEC cartel has been seriously threatened. As a result of
these developments, today's oil prices are substantially below the fore-
casts upon which were predicated many decisions to build nuclear
plants to replace oil-fired plants.a"
The changes in the world oil market in the past few years also
have weakened the "national interest/insecure fuel" rationale for re-
placing oil- and gas-fired plants with nuclear plants. The United States
is now importing far less oil than it did during the late 1970's, 5 and
the sources of the oil that is imported are more diverse than they were
in the 1970's.3' Thus, concern about a possible cessation of oil imports
resulting from changes in geopolitical conditions has diminished
significantly.
3 7
FORT., Apr. 14, 1983, at 19, 20; see also U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER
ANNUAL 32 figure 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as POWER ANNUAL].
2 See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY, June 1982, at 87-
91 (theoretical operating reserve was 28%) [hereinafter cited as POWER MONTHLY]; see
also infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
21 See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, TRENDS IN THE
CAPACITY UTILIZATION AND FUEL CONSUMPTION OF ELECTRIC UTILITY POWER-
PLANTS, 1970-1978, at 13 (1980) (between 1970 and 1978 the rate of increase in the
amount of generating capacity exceeded the rate of increase in demand for electricity);
NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 7.
So INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 80-82 (1982).
31 Id. at 82 figure 3.1. 0'
31 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, MONTHLY ENERGY REV., Jan. 1983, at 80-81.
33 Id.
3' For instance, Middle South Utilities Company predicated its decision to con-
struct the Grand Gulf nuclear plant on estimates that the price of oil, which was $14
per barrel in early 1979, would be $48 per barrel by 1985 and more than $80 per
barrel by 1990. Initial Brief of Middle South Energy, Inc. at 123, F.E.R.C. Docket
No. 82-616 (July 13, 1983); see also id. at 99-104, 112-113, 119-120. In fact, the price
of oil in 1983 was only $29 per barrel. INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK, May 1983, at 145.
15 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 32, at 8 (imports dropped from 13.328
quadrillion BTU's in 1979 to 8.844 quadrillion BTU's in 1981).
3' See id. at 36-37 (total imports from Arab OPEC states have declined from 1979
to 1982 while imports from non-OPEC sources have remained relatively constant).
3 There is genuine doubt, as well, about the amount of oil actually saved by a
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The natural gas market has produced similar surprises that have
further eroded the basis for many of the decisions to build nuclear
plants. Natural gas prices increased at a very high rate from 1973
through 1982.38 In 1983, however, gas prices began to decline.39 More-
over, the gas shortage that appeared in the early 1970's and reached
crisis proportions during the winter of ,1976-19774o has disappeared.4
That shortage has been replaced by a surplus so great that it has halted
virtually all sales of new gas supplies and now threatens the financial
viability of many gas producers.42 Thus, the national interest/insecure
fuel justification for replacing gas-fired generators with nuclear plants
has disappeared.
Finally, nuclear power plants have not become the reliable, inex-
pensive source of electricity projected by most experts in the early
1970's. Nuclear plants completed in 1983 cost approximately ten times
the amount initially projected for such plants; recently completed plants
have had an average construction cost of over three billion dollars43 and
have taken an average of twelve years to complete.44 Moreover, the re-
liability of nuclear plants has been called into question as a result of
the fact that a number of plants have been shut down,45 some indefi-
shift towards reliance on nuclear generation. See Potential Displacement of Oil by Nu-
clear Energy and Coal in Electric Utilities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Over-
sight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980) (testimony of George L. Weil, energy consultant) (dis-
puting energy department and nuclear industry estimates of the amount of oil use dis-
placed by nuclear energy).
11 See Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Nat-
ural Gas Market, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1983); Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation,
Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63 (1982).
11 See, e.g., FOSTER NATURAL GAS REP., June 30, 1982, at 12, 12a.
40 See SUBCOMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF THE SEN. COMM. ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SEss., THE STATUS OF THE NATION'S
PREPAREDNESS FOR THE WINTER OF 1977-78, at 3-4 (Comm. Print 1977).
4 See End of Gas Surplus Seen Spark for U.S. Drilling, OIL & GAS J., Sept. 5,
1983, at 48, 48-49.
42 See Tussing & Barlow, A Survival Strategy fdr Gas Companies in the Post-
OPEC Era, 111 PuB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 3, 1983, at 13; FOSTER NATURAL GA REP.,
July 21, 1983, app. at 1-7.
4- See 2 CosTs OF ELECTRICITY, supra note 2, at 34 figure 9. Much of the esca-
lation in the capital costs of such projects is attributable to unanticipated changes in the
rate of inflation exacerbated by the long construction time of new nuclear plants. Cur-
rently such escalation costs account for a significant portion of the costs of such projects.
See id. (escalation acc6unts for approximately $1.2 billion on average in new plants).
This factor may represent as much as 65% of the original estimated plant cost. Id. at
35 n.7.
44 See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 2, at 38. The lengthy construction
period is often fraught with delays connected with licensing, regulatory-compliance, or
construction. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR
POWER REGULATION 129-55 (1980) [hereinafter cited as POWER REGULATION].
45 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 37 Pub.
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nitely, because of safety risks associated with their design, construction,
or operation.48
As a result of the significant disparity between prediction and real-
ity, the completion of a new nuclear plant creates a situation far differ-
ent from that originally expected. Instead of lowering electricity rates, a
new plant usually increases rates dramatically,47 sometimes by more
than fifty percent.48 Instead of providing a badly needed increment of
new supply, a new plant typically adds to a utility's preexisting margin
of excess generating capacity.49 As utilities have recognized the growing
disparity between the market conditions forecast and reality, they have
canceled many partially completed plants. Cancellation decisions inva-
riably are followed by requests for rate increases to recover the full cost
of investments in canceled plants.50 This is the historical background
for the many painful decisions forced upon regulatory agencies today.
If the present regulatory crisis is a product solely of unavoidable
errors in forecasting future conditions, the proper regulatory response
seems obvious. Utilities should be allowed to recover all costs of can-
celed plants and of completed plants that represent excess capacity.
Those costs should be considered an inevitable social cost and, as such,
should be distributed widely across all segments of society through in-
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 77 (Pa. P.U.C. 1980) (Commission removes the Three Mile
Island unit 1 plant from rate base because, inter alia, although undamaged by the
March 1979 accident, unit 1 had been out of service for substantial amounts of time);
accord Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 85 N.J. 520, 428 A.2d 498 (1981).
46 See generally REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THREE MILE
ISLAND (1980).
17 See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 422 So. 2d 767
(Ala. 1982) (utility sought 18% rate increase after placing nuclear plant on-line re-
sulted in a $4 million loss per month to utility).
48 See High Rate Requests Spread Out Costs of Plants, New Orleans Times-Pica-
yune, Sept. 11, 1983, § 1, at 20, col. 1 (reporting that the area's two utilities have
requested rate increases that vary from 48% to 97% depending on the customer class);
The March of Events, New York. Shoreham-Related Rate Increase Filed, 111 PuB.
UTIL. FORT., June 23, 1983, at 49 (56.5% rate increase three-fourths of which is for
recovery of costs of Shoreham nuclear plant).
" See, e.g., Powerless Utilities, supra note 8, at 19, col. 4 (Public Service Co. of
Ind., with excess capacity of 47%, has recently announced plans to abandon its share in
the Marble Hill Nuclear Plant). Revised forecasts of future "increases" in the demand
for electricity indicate growing margins of excess generating capacity. See NUCLEAR
PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 70 (decrease in demand for electricity was
cited as the sole reason for 17 unit cancellations and has contributed to cancellations of
34 other units); see also 1 COSTS OF ELECTRICITY, supra note 2, at 2 (many utilities
have delayed completion of plants under construction or in planning due to declining
demand growth and the consequent need to "work off large reserve capacity"); Wald,
Coal Plants Held Cheaper Than Nuclear, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1983, § 1, at 3, col. 4
(slowdown in growth of electricity demand combined with rising construction costs has
caused cancellation of 87 plants since 1975).
"0 See generally NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 33-57.
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creases in electricity rates.
There are three problems with this simple solution, however.
First, allowing complete recovery would increase consumers' electric
bills dramatically without producing any tangible benefit for the con-
sumers. For this reason alone, the full recovery of investment costs has
no chance of emerging from the regulatory process as a solution. Sec-
ond, allowing utilities to transfer to consumers all the risks and costs of
erroneous investment decisions produces results strikingly different
from the results of erroneous investment decisions made by firms in
unregulated markets.5 The vision of extreme dichotomy between the
harsh consequences of mistakes in the private market in which most
investors participate and what would be the virtually nonexistent conse-
quences of mistakes in a regulated market in which investors were com-
pletely insulated from risks causes many to be skeptical of the proposed
solution of allowing full recovery for bad investments.5"
Third, today's investment mistakes in retrospect may not be en-
tirely attributable to unavoidable errors in utility forecasting.53 Regula-
tory theory provides an alternative explanation for many utility invest-
ment decisions that appear in retrospect to have been imprudent.
Economists Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson hypothesize that regu-
lated utilities have an incentive to overinvest in capital assets. 54 The
incentive to overinvest results from the fact that, under many condi-
tions, the standard formula for calculating utility rates permits utilities
to earn a rate of return in excess of their actual cost of capital. 5 This
incentive could either induce a utility to predicate its decisions to invest
in new plants on forecasts that were biased in favor of the need for new
capacity or to err on the side of investing when in genuine doubt about
the reliability of its forecasts. There is little doubt that the Averch and
Johnson effect has existed at various times in the history of the electric
utility industry, including the early 1970's. To the extent that the utili-
ties' erroneous investment decisions were made in response to a regula-
tory incentive to overinvest, complete cost recovery may be inappropri-
ate. Obviously, utilities should not be rewarded for wasteful investment
51 See infra text accompanying notes 168-90.
52 See NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 71.
53 For example, one utility made no independent forecast but based its decision to
construct several nuclear plants entirely on overly optimistic projections made by the
potential supplier of the plant. See Glamour of Nuclear Power Seduced the Industry,
New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sept. 11, 1983, § 1, at 19, col. 1; see also infra text
accompanying notes 54-56.
" Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM.
EcoN. REV. 1052 (1962).
5 Id. at 1059.
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decisions based on biased forecast methodologies.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine the extent to which
utility investment decisions were influenced by the Averch and Johnson
effect for two reasons. First, the effect varies dramatically over time and
among utilities, usually as a function of change in public sentiment to-
ward utilities.58 Second, the incentive relates not to actual regulatory
conditions at a particular point in time but to expected regulatory con-
ditions during the entire period in which the utility earns a return on
the investment.
The principal obstacles to determining an appropriate regulatory
response stem from the impossibility of quantifying and factoring out
the effect of this incentive to overinvest. The impossibility of precisely
quantifying the incentive makes it extraordinarily difficult to create a
regulatory climate that does not provide an incentive for either under or
overinvestment in plants.
II. MAJOR REGULATORY QUESTIONS AND SOLUTI6NS TO DATE
It is impossible to address all of the legal and policy questions
presented by the large energy projects that are in various stages of com-
pletion today. The issues raised span a vast spectrum from municipal
law, to contract law,57 to bankruptcy law,5" to the intricacies of the
synthetic fuels funding authority of the Department of Energy.59 A se-
ries of fairly predictable regulatory decisions have to be made with re-
spect to the vast majority of projects, however. These are: (1) whether a
firm should be allowed to initiate construction of a new plant; (2)
whether a firm should be required to cancel or abandon a plant; (3)
whether a firm should be allowed to recover in its rates the costs of a
canceled or abandoned plant; (4) whether a firm should be allowed to
earn a return on a new plant; and, (5) how to handle a variety of
decisions that may be labelled, for convenience, jurisdictional disputes.
5 See Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the
Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & EcON. 291 (1974). Indeed, in
recent years, utilities seem to have experienced a reverse Averch-Johnson effect: they
have been deterred from making capital investments because the rate of return allowed
them by the regulators has consistently been lower than their market cost of capital.
Navarro, Save Now, Freeze Later: The Real Price of Cheap Electricity, REGULATiON,
Sept./Oct. 1983, at 31, 32; see also FERC as a Least-Cost Electric Regulator: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-27 (1982) (statement of
C.M. Butler, III, chairman of FERO) [hereinafter cited as Butler Testimony].
5' See FOSTER NATURAL GAS REP., July 21, 1983, at 8.
5 See supra note 6.
5 See DOE-Led Group to Weigh Great Plains Aid, INsiDE ENERGY, Apr. 18,
1983, at 1.
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Each of these questions will be considered initially as a discrete deci-
sion, but they are by no means independent. Each decision affects every
other decision, and the underlying policy issues are common to all
decisions.
A. The Decision to Permit Construction of a Plant
The decision to begin construction of a new generating plant is the
utility's, at least in the first instance. In the case of a nuclear generating
plant, the utility must obtain approval from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC),60 but the scope of the NRC's authority is limited
and does not encompass the utility's need for additional generating ca-
pacity.6" In some states, the utility must obtain prior approval from the
state utility commission before it can begin a major project.6 2 Typically,
such approval requires a finding that construction of the plant is in the
public interest.6 3 In some states, however, the legislature has declined to
give the utility commission the power to certify new plants, leaving that
decision entirely to the utility's management."
Even in states where the utility commission has no direct power
over the decision to build a new plant, it often has some indirect control
over that decision. For example, commissions often have the power to
approve issues of securities by the utilities they regulate,6 5 and some
can withhold approval on the basis of the company's proposed use of
the proceeds of the issue.66 In other cases, a commission without direct
regulatory power over utility construction plans may have an opportu-
nity to review the prudence of such plants when asked to grant the
utility a current rate increase, since utilities often predicate increased
60 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2134, 2235 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
61 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1724 (1983); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 550 (1978) ("The
[Atomic Energy] Commission's prime area of concern in the licensing context, . . . is
national security, public health and safety.").
62 See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.49 (West 1982).
6 See, e.g., Kelley v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 412 Mich. 385, 396-400, 316
N.W.2d 187, 190-92 (1982) (Under the Michigan Utility Securities Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 460.301 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982), the Public Service Commission is
not empowered to evaluate the reasonableness of the decision to build the project.);
Attorney Gen. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 118 Mich. App. 311, 324 N.W.2d 628 (1982);
Public Serv. Co. v. Oklahoma, 645 P.2d 465 (Okla. 1982); see also Howe, Progress of
Regulation Trends and Topics, Utility Security Issues: The Scope of Commission In-
quiry, 110 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 14, 1982, at 61-64.
63 See, e.g., 66 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1901-1903 (1979).
66 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 501 Pa.
153, 460 A.2d 734 (1983).
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cash flow needs on future construction plans.6 7 Where the state com-
mission has no direct authority to certify proposed new plants, however,
a utility often has discretion to proceed with construction of a new
plant. Indeed, several commission orders attempting to exercise indirect
control over utility construction plans have been reversed by state courts
on the grounds that the commission cannot regulate indirectly a deci-
sion which the legislature has not empowered it to regulate directly.""
The decision to construct a new generating plant, or to authorize
such construction, is complicated. At least in theory, the decision should
be based on forecasts of such factors as demand for electricity in the
area served by the utility, availability of power from the utility's other
sources, the cost to the utility of oil, gas, coal, and uranium, the cost of
constructing the plant, and the utility's cost of capital during the con-
struction period. The accuracy of each of these forecasts is critically
dependent upon the accuracy of assumptions concerning future eco-
nomic conditions in the world, the nation, and the geographic area
served by the utility, as well as the accuracy of assumptions concerning
the future relationship between macroeconomic variables and conditions
in specific markets for each form of energy.
Moreover, some forecasts will have to span longer periods of time
than others. Some factors, such as construction cost and cost of capital,
should be forecast for the construction period: ten to twelve years.
Other factors, such as the demand for electricity and the cost of oil, gas,
and uranium should be forecast for the expected life of the plant: thirty
to forty years beginning at the end of the ten to twelve year construc-
tion period. Thus, for instance, a decision to build a new generating
plant in 1973 must be based on forecasts of economic conditions
through at least 2013. It is hard to imagine a more difficult and risky
decision. Even forecasts of only a few of these factors made by well-
qualified specialists and covering much shorter time periods have often
proven extremely unreliable.6
Yet the accuracy of these forecasts is critical to the utility and to
the population it serves. Forces, such as the regulatory incentive to
overinvest, that distort forecasting methodologies, or that provide an in-
centive consistently to err on the side of building new facilities, will
have an obvious and adverse effect. If the utility's forecasts are biased
in favor of building new plants or if the utility, when in genuine doubt
over the necessity of a new plant, consistently responds to the incentive
'1 AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, PUBLIC UTILITY LAW 86, 101 (1979).
.See Howe, supra note 64, at 61-63.
6' See UNCERTAIN FTrrURE, supra note 19, at 17-56; see also ENERGY FUTURE
234-67 (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin eds. 1979).
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to overinvest, the utility or its customers must absorb millions or even
billions of dollars in sunk costs attributable to a facility that may pro-
vide little or no benefit.
70
B. The Decision to Cancel or Abandon a Plant
The decision to cancel a partially completed plant or to abandon
an operable plant is also the utility's in the first instance. In states
where the utility commission lacks the authority to certify a new plant,
it also lacks the power to order the cancellation or abandonment of a
plant. Generally, states that grant the utility commission the power to
certify a new plant also grant the commission statutory authority to
order cancellation or abandonment of a plant.7 1 In some jurisdictions,
however, the commission's power to order cancellation is limited by ap-
plication of the constitutional prohibition against taking private prop-
erty without just compensation.7 Agency power to cancel is limited by
a combination of its initial approval of the plant and the utility's detri-
mental reliance upon such approval through investment of substantial
capital in the plant.
Theoretically, the decision to cancel or abandon a plant should be
analytically identical to the decision to initiate construction of a new
plant, with two significant differences. First, forecasts of future condi-
tions relied upon as the basis for a cancellation decision should be more
accurate because the relevant future period is a few years closer than it
was when the initial decision was made to construct the plant. Second,
sunk costs are irrelevant to the cancellation decision. In deciding
whether a partially completed plant should be finished or abandoned,
the only costs that should be considered are the costs of completing the
plant, the operating costs of the plant, and the opportunity costs associ-
ated with the inability to sell those relatively few components that have
a net positive value upon removal from the plant. Thus, in the case of a
typical nuclear plant, its high capital costs and low operating costs
73
make the stage of completion of the plant critical to the decision to
cancel or complete. In terms of aggregate social welfare, the decision to
"o An error on the other side can also be costly. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
supra note 2, at 37-39 (1982); see also U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 19, at
30-35. At best, such an error would yield much higher utility costs as a result of exten-
sive use of high cost peaking units and obsolete baseload units. At worst, an underesti-
mate of the need for new capacity would result in brownouts or rotating blackouts.
7 See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Public Serv. Co., 122 N.H. 1062, 1070, 454 A.2d 435, 440 (1982).
7 See 2 COSTS OF ELEcTRicrry, supra note 2, at 121 figure 22 (estimating
higher combined fuel, operating, and maintainence costs for coal-fired plants than for
nuclear plants in all but two regions of the country).
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cancel a three-billion-dollar plant that is eighty percent complete is
equivalent to a decision not to build a six-hundred-million-dollar plant.
By extension, operable plants should only be abandoned if their operat-
ing costs alone exceed the cost of obtaining equal amounts of energy
from other sources.
C. The Regulatory Treatment of Completed Plants
Once a plant is completed and operable, the capital investment in
the plant ordinarily is added to the utility's rate base. This immediately
affects the utility's rates through the standard ratemaking formula: R
= 0 + (B x r), where R is the utility's allowed revenue requirement,
0 is its operating cost, B is rate base, and r is the utility's cost of capi-
tal.74 B increases as the utility's investment increases. 0 increases to the
extent of the annual depreciation of the plant but decreases to the ex-
tent that the new plant permits a reduction in the use of plants with
higher operating costs (principally fuel costs). Therefore, the inclusion
of a new plant in the ratemaking formula will have significant and
immediate impact on rates.
A completed plant can be added to a utility's rate base to the ex-
tent that it passes one or both of two traditional regulatory tests: the
prudent investment test and the used and useful test.75 The prudent
investment test is the regulatory analogue to the common law negli-
gence doctrine." If a utility makes an investment decision that is im-
prudent based on the information reasonably available to it at the time
of its decision, all costs associated with that decision are disallowed in
determining the rates the utility can charge.
All of a utility's investment or any portion thereof can be excluded
from rates based upon a finding of imprudence in any utility decision
related to the investment, including the decision to construct a plant;
the decision not to cancel the plant; decisions regarding the design of,
and the technology incorporated into, the plant, and the decision
whether to allocate contractually some risks and costs associated with
the plant to third parties.7 7 Application of the prudent investment test
almost always results in the inclusion of plant investments in rate
74 See generally E. GELLHORN & R.J. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 96-100
(1982).
7' See 1 A.J.G. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 139-90
(1969).
7' See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Missouri Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 n.1 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Consumers Power
Co., 14 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 15-16 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
7 See Consolidated Edison Co., 73 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 417, 429-42 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1968).
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base."' Undoubtedly, the infrequency of decisions to exclude is attribu-
table to a combination of two factors. First, utility decisions are rarely
blatantly imprudent when viewed in light of the knowledge and alter-
natives reasonably available to the utility's management at the time of
the decision and the overall complexity of the considerations involved.
The conditions forecast by experts in the 1970'S,71 for example, suggest
that the utilities' decisions to build new plants during that period were
reasonable and prudent at the time they were made. Second, the practi-
cal burden of proving imprudence is so high that most parties to utility
rate cases are deterred from undertaking such an effort.80 In order to
succeed, any attempt to establish the imprudence of a utility's decision
to construct a new plant would require extraordinarily large expendi-
tures for the services of lawyers, economists, and engineers.81 Litigation
costs of this magnitude exceed the resources available to most of the
consumer groups and governmental bodies that participate in rate cases.
Thus, the fact that utility decisions to build new plants are rarely held
to be imprudent does not necessarily support an inference that virtually
all such decisions are prudent.8 2
The second traditional test for including a plant in rate base is the
used and useful test. As its name suggests, the critical question under
this test is whether the plant is actually used and useful to the utility in
providing regulated services.8" Historically, the used and useful test was
employed primarily to exclude from the rate base investments in plants
that are not yet operable, investments in assets that provide benefits
exclusively to parties other than consumers of regulated services, and
investments in plants that are no longer used because of obsolescence,
78 My research has uncovered no case in which a utility's entire investment in an
operating plant has been disallowed as imprudent. FERC has never held a utility in-
vestment imprudent. See Butler Testimony, supra note 56, at 55. Even cases disallow-
ing a substantial portion of an investment as imprudent are rare. As examples of cases
where a substantial portion was disallowed, see Consumers Power Co., 14 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 19 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Houston Lighting & Power
Co., 50 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 157 (Tex. P.U.C. 1982).
71 See supra text accompanying notes 16-25.
80 Proving that a utility decision was imprudent obviously requires the presenta-
tion of a vast amount of data, most of which is far more accessible to the utility than to
a challenger. Such challenges are, accordingly, rarely made and are even more rarely
successful. See Butler Testimony, supra note 56, at 14, 18.
81 Even the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission does not have sufficient re-
sources to determine whether a utility has acted prudently in deciding to build a partic-
ular plant. See id. at 14-18.
82 Indeed, the central thesis of this Article is that many such decisions were im-
prudent in that they were essentially products of the regulatory incentive to overinvest
in capital assets.
83 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 29 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 502, 505-08 (Pa. P.U.C. 1979).
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chronic mechanical failure, or an order from a government agency re-
quiring termination of operations for a sustained period of time. Unlike
the prudent investment test, the used and useful test does not make the
finding of fault a prerequisite for the exclusion of an asset from rate
base."
The relationship between the prudent investment test and the used
and useful test has always been vague. Moreover, the many high-stake
rate cases with which utility commissions recently have been confronted
have done nothing to clarify that relationship. Because of the difference
in focus between the two tests, the failure of one does not mean the
failure of the other. A plant can be the product of imprudent decisions
and yet be used and useful.85 Conversely, a plant can be the product of
prudent decisions but not be used and useful because of factors beyond
the control of the utility or because of changes in conditions beyond the
reasonable foresight of the utility."' A few cases have held that a utility
must be allowed to reflect in its rates all investments that were prudent
when made even if the resulting assets are not useful because of unfore-
seen changes in circumstances.8 7 In most jurisdictions, however, the two
tests operate as independent bases for excluding an asset from rate
base."'
Many recent cases have severely tested the traditional regulatory
approach to new plants. Assume, for instance, that a utility with preex-
isting excess capacity completes a new nuclear generating plant and
requests a substantial rate increase to reflect the addition of this three-
billion-dollar investment to its rate base. The result would be a system
with substantial excess capacity, a doubling or tripling of rate base, and
a rate increase in the range of twenty-five to seventy-five percent.8 9
This is the type of regulatory situation routinely faced by utility com-
missions at present.
In this situation, most commissions would probably conclude that
the decision to build the new plant was prudent when made and that
" See, e.g., id.
85 See, e.g., Consumers Power Co., 14 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 15, 19
(Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
" Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 37 (Pub. Util.
Rep.) 4th (PUR) 77, 86 (Pa. P.U.C. 1980).
'7 See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis. 2d
256, 325 N.W.2d 867 (1982).
" See Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 37 Pub. Util.
Rep., 4th (PUR) 77, 85, 93 (Pa. P.U.C).
89 See, e.g., The March of Events, Arizona: Rate Increase Filed, 111 PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Aug. 4, 1983, at 55 (31% increase over an 18-month period); The March of
Events, Michigan: Electric Utility Files for Rate Increase, 111 PuB. UTIL FORT., Aug.
18, 1983, at 51 (36% increase over a three-year period); see also supra note 48 (rate
increases of 48-97%).
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the continuing decision not to cancel was also prudent. 90 The decision
not to cancel is a day-to-day decision that should be based on the most
recent forecasts of critical parameters, especially estimates of future de-
mand and completion costs. In the situation just described those revised
forecasts typically would have indicated less and less need for the plant.
The apparent reduction in need for the plant, however, usually is ac-
companied by a reduction in the estimated cost of completion simply
because the percentage of the plant remaining to be completed has de-
creased. Thus, agency determinations that utilities acted prudently in
declining to cancel plants often reflect prudence in fact. On the other
hand, some agency determinations may have more to do with the cost
and difficulty of proving imprudence than the fact of prudence."1 It is
impossible to determine what proportion of cases fall in the one cate-
gory and what proportion in the other.
The used and useful test does not suit the typical nuclear generat-
ing plant situation any better than the prudent investment test. With
the exception of a few plants that have been closed for safety reasons,
new nuclear power plants clearly are "useful" in the sense that they
are capable of generating electricity. They are also "used" to the maxi-
mum extent possible since they cost substantially less to operate than do
fossil fuel plants.92 In another sense, however, a new nuclear plant may
not be used and useful. If the utility had preexisting excess capacity
such that the new plant represents a mere addition to excess capacity,
the construction of the plant has clearly rendered some of the system's
generating capacity no longer useful.
Regulators and reviewing courts have responded to this recurrent
factual pattern in various ways. Many have allowed the inclusion of
the entire investment in rate base.9" This rate treatment is based on the
reasoning that even though the utility now has substantial excess capac-
ity that capacity was not the product of any imprudent decision by the
utility and the new plant is both used and useful. This resolution is
consistent with the traditional method of applying the two tests for in-
clusion of capital assets in rate base.
Some agencies have taken different approaches, however. In Kan-
sas City Power & Light Co.," the Missouri Commission disallowed the
utility's investment in a new nuclear plant based on a finding that the
go See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
92 See supra note 73.
11 See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co., 35 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 49 (Ill.
Commerce Comm'n 1980); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 105
Wis. 2d 385, 313 N.W.2d 847, 849-50 n.6 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
" 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980).
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company was imprudent in continuing to build the plant in the face of
revised forecasts showing no need for the plant as early as four years
before the plant was completed."5 This decision is perhaps best de-
scribed as disingenuous given that the very same commission had certi-
fied the plant based on a finding of need seven years earlier" and had
made a subsequent finding of need just one year before it concluded
that the utility was imprudent in not abandoning the project four years
earlier.97 How could the utility have known that the plant was not
needed in 1976, when the Commission found that it was needed in
1973 and 1979?
In Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.,"" the North Dakota Commission
disallowed a portion of the utility's investment in a new coal-fired gen-
erating plant previously certified by the Commission. Using a question-
able definition of excess capacity, 9  the Commission found that the new
plant created a condition of substantial excess capacity in the system.100
The Commission also found that this excess capacity was attributable
to an unanticipated regional decline in the demand for electricity rather
than to imprudent decisions by the utility.01 Nevertheless, the Com-
mission held that the portion of the utility's investment in the plant that
corresponded to the excess capacity on the system should be denied in-
clusion in rate base.1"2 The Commission reasoned that even though the
new plant was fully used and useful, it was the new plant that created
the excess capacity. 03 The Commission also concluded that its treat-
ment of excess capacity would provide utilities a needed incentive to
forecast accurately.10°
In Park Towne v. Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission,10 5
the Pennsylvania Commission had chosen a different remedy when con-
fronted with facts similar to those considered by the North Dakota
95 Id. at 14.
" Id. at 9.
7 Id. at 38 (Fraas, Comm'r, dissenting).
"8 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 249 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981).
9 Compare infra text accompanying notes 209-25 (suggesting the need for a com-
prehensive definition of "excess" capacity, which would take into account adequate re-
serve margins, temporary surpluses to make use of economies of scale, and other market
considerations with Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 254-
56 (defining excess capacity as the difference between peak generating capability and
the sum of peak load plus reserve obligations).
"00 Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. at 254.
101 Id. at 255.
102 Id. at 256.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 255-56.
105 61 Pa. Commw. 285, 433 A.2d 620 (1981) (reviewing and upholding a deci-
sion of the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission).
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Commission. Because the addition of a new plant created excess capac-
ity on the system, the Commission excluded the Philadelphia Electric
Company's remaining investment in several old plants from rate base
on the theory that the excess capacity created by the new plant ren-
dered the old plants no longer useful. The Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania upheld the Commission's decision.
The Connecticut Commission took yet another approach in Con-
necticut Light & Power Co.'08 Although it found that recent additions
of nuclear power plants had produced excess capacity it simultaneously
found that these additions had improved the utility's generating mix by
allowing a reduction in the use of high-operating-cost fossil fuel
units.107 The Commission apparently feared that inclusion of the util-
ity's full investment in excess capacity in rate base might encourage the
utility to increase peak load demand in order to reduce the appearance
of excess capacity. 08 To forestall this possibility, the Commission indi-
cated its intent to establish a ceiling on the amount of excess capacity
that could be included in rate base subject to potential exemption if the
utility demonstrates that it has obtained conservation and efficiency
gains.
10 9
The Iowa Commission recently rejected both the prudent invest-
ment test and the used and useful test as inappropriate for regulating
utilities with excess capacity. In Iowa Public Service Co."' the Com-
mission took the position that the prudent investment test was inade-
quate because it failed to provide utility management with an incentive
constantly to rethink investment decisions in light of new develop-
ments.111 The Commission also rejected application of the used and
useful test in a manner that disallowed all return on investments in
excess capacity because it concluded that such a decision would impose
upon management an impossible standard the nonattainment of which
would result in an extreme financial penalty.' 12 The Commission chose
instead an approach that it described as balancing the interests of inves-
"' 30 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 67 (Conn. Div. of Pub. Util. Control 1979).
107 Id. at 92.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 92-93.
10 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339 (Iowa Commerce Comm'n 1982); see also
Iowa Power & Light Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 405, 418-19 (Iowa Commerce
Comm'n 1983). The Iowa approach was explicitly endorsed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis. 2d 127, 136, 325
N.W.2d 339, 344 (Wis. 1982). The approach was codified with modifications on July
1, 1983, when the Iowa legislature adopted IowA CODE § 476.53 (Supp. 1983).
. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 367-68.
111 Id. at 368.
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tors and consumers."' 3 It established a formula through which the util-
ity's rate of return is reduced by an amount proportionate to its excess
capacity.
11 4
As the preceding discussion indicates, utility commission treatment
of excess .capacity has, not yet crystallized into a single clear pattern.
Commissions, reviewing courts, and legislatures are participating in a
dynamic process with no specific conclusion in sight. It is safe to as-
sume, however, that regulatory treatment of excess capacity will con-
tinue to range from total disallowance of excess capacity, at one ex-
treme, to total allowance at the other.
D. The Regulatory Treatment of Canceled or Abandoned Plants
If a utility chooses to cancel a partially completed plant or is or-
dered to do so by a commission, the commission must determine the
appropriate treatment of the utility's investment in the canceled plant.
An analogous situation arises when a utility decides to abandon an op-
erable plant. The investment at issue in the case of an abandoned plant,
however, exceeds the typical investment in a canceled plant. In such
cases, the utility normally asks for a rate increase to reflect complete
amortization of the investment in the canceled plant over a relatively
short period, five years for example, combined with a rate of return on
the unamortized balance of the investment. In reviewing such a request,
the commission typically applies some combination of the prudent in-
vestment test and the used and useful test."15 Application of the prudent
investment test requires analysis of both the original decision to com-
mence construction and the subsequent decision to cancel the partially
completed plant. As is the case with newly completed plants, utility
commissions rarely find any decision associated with a canceled plant
imprudent. Instead, commissions routinely conclude that the utility ac-
ted prudently at each point of decision. 16 To what extent these find-
ings reflect the actual prudence of utility investment decisions and to
what extent the heavy burden of proof imposed by the prudent invest-
ment test on the opponents of rate increases is, again, impossible to
determine."' 7
I's Id.
114 Id. at 370-71. The Commission's description of the formula is set out infra
note 222.
115 See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 29 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PJR) 65, 80-
81 (Va. Corp. Comm'n 1979).
11 See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 46 (Va.
Corp. Comm'n 1981); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 31 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 435
(Cal. P.U.C. 1979).
111 See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
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The virtually automatic finding of prudence, however, does not
necessarily mean that the utility will be granted the rate treatment it
requests for its investment in canceled plants, although a majority of
commissions do allow some recovery.118 A few commissions allocate all
the costs of the investment to consumers, but most divide th6 costs be-
tween the utility and consumers by allowing the utility to recover only
its out-of-pocket costs, on terms less favorable than those sought by the
utility, and with some costs disallowed." 9 The Maine Commission's
decision in Bangor Hydroelectric Co. is typical.120 The utility was per-
mitted to amortize its investment over a five-year period, but it was not
permitted to include the unamortized balance in its rate base and it was
not permitted to recover its allowance for funds used during construc-
tion (AFUDC) 21 The New Jersey Board of Public Utilities arrived at
a similar result in Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,122 except that it
extended the amortization period to fifteen years, 2 ' thereby decreasing
the percentage of the utility's investment that could be recovered in
rates. The Commission reasoned that the company was strong enough
financially to endure a prolonged period of recovery and that the
shorter period requested by the company would impose too heavy a
burden on its ratepayers.12" The decision of the Maine Commission
produced an allocation of the costs of the investment in the canceled
plant of fifty-one percent to the utility and forty-nine percent to con-
118 See NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 44-45 table 10 (of
decisions allocating costs exceeding $50 million, 26 have allowed partial recovery of
costs, 11 have allowed full recovery, and 8 have denied all recovery).
9 The New York Public Service Commission has consistently permitted the allo-
cation of all prudently incurred expenses to consumers. See, e.g., Rochester Gas &
Elec. Corp., 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 386 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982). The
North Carolina Utilities Commission allowed full recovery for the abandonment of
North Anna unit 4. See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 327, 354 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1982); see also NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLA-
TIONS, supra note 3, at 49-50; A Survey of Regulatory Treatment of Plant Cancella-
tion Costs, 111 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 31, 1983, at 52.
12 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 503 (Me. P.U.C. 1982). Cf Central Me.
Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 433 A.2d 331, 341-45 (Me. 1981) (Commission
finds that, although investments in nuclear plant were not imprudent, the plant was not
used and useful. The commission therefore authorized the company to amortize some
expenses over a five-year period but did not allow it to amortize associated allowance
for funds used during construction (AFUDC)).
121 Bangor Hydroelec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 556-58.
122 Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 54 (N.J. Bd.
Pub. Util. 1981).
123 Id. at 57-58.
124 The utility company had suggested that amortization take place over a 10-year
period with the inclusion of the unamortized investment in the rate base. Staff and rate
counsel recommended successfully, however, that the loss be shared between ratepayers
and the company's stockholders over a 15-year amortization period. Id. at 57.
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sumers,125 while the New Jersey Board effectively allocated eighty-four
percent of the costs to the utility and sixteen percent to consumers. 126
Commission decisions allowing the recovery of investments in can-
celed plants but not allowing the recovery of the entire cost of the capi-
tal component of such investments are based on one interpretation of
the used and useful test.12 7 The rationale is that because the investment
never produced a used and useful asset, the utility is not entitled to a
return on the investment, but because the investment resulted from a
prudent decision made in an effort to serve consumers, the utility is
entitled to recover the investment itself, defined to exclude all costs of
capital.
Some decisions, however, have permitted neither a return on nor a
return of the utility's investment in a canceled plant.21 For example, in
Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utilities Commission, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the Ohio Commission does not have the statu-
tory power to authorize recovery of any portion of an investment in a
canceled plant because such an investment does not meet the statutory
definition of an "ordinary expense.
'
1
12
As is the case with the excess capacity issue, the principles to be
applied to investments in abandoned plants are still unsettled in many
jurisdictions. Many commissions are in the process of considering, or
reconsidering, how such investments should be treated. 30 Some state
courts have reversed commission decisions in this area, 11 and many
more cases are presently pending. A number of state legislatures are
considering statutory solutions to the problem.1 3 2 A few states now have
statutes that may be interpreted to require disallowance of all invest-
125 See NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 56 table 12.
126 Id.
12 See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 29 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 65 (Va.
Corp. Comm'n 1979).
128 See, e.g., Pacific Power & Light Co., 53 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 24 (Mont.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983); Pacific Power & Light Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
82 (Or. P.U.C. 1982); see also NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 50-
51; A Survey of Regulatory Treatment of Plant Cancellation Costs, supra note 119.
129 67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 164, 423 N.E.2d 820, 827 (1981). See also Dayton Power
& Light Co. v. Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 91, 447 N.E.2d 733 (1983);
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 107, 447
N.E.2d 746 (1983).
180 See, e.g., The March of Events, North Carolina: Cherokee Unit 1 Canceled,
111 PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 26, 1983, at 54. See generally NUCLEAR PLANT CANCEL-
LATIONS, supra note 3, at 43-57 (description of the different approaches taken).
1i See, e.g., Office of Consumer's Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n, 67 Ohio St.
2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981); Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Public Serv. Conm'n,
109 Wis. 2d 256, 325 N.W.2d 867 (1982).
183 See, e.g., The March of Events, Connecticut: Millstone Cost Cap and CWIP
Bills Advance, 111 PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 26, 1983, at 52-53.
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ments in canceled plants,""3 and the number of states with statutes of
this type is likely to increase over time. Such statutes are part of a
distinct trend to allocate an increasing proportion of the costs of can-
celed plants to the utilities."3
E. Multijurisdictional Disputes
Because of the substantial economies of scale and coordination in-
herent in generating and transmitting electricity, 3 5 it is increasingly
common for several utilities operating in different states to sponsor
jointly a new generating plant.13 6 These multijurisdiction plants, how-
ever, present particularly troublesome regulatory problems because reg-
ulation has traditionally been geared to the state level. Utilities have
adopted two different structures for jointly sponsored multijurisdiction
projects: one approach has been to set up the plant under the joint
ownership of all the companies concerned,"3 ' and the other approach
has been to vest ownership in a single company and then allocate by
contract the capacity, costs, and risks among all the utilities involved. 3
These two ownership structures produce very different sets of regula-
tory problems and outcomes, particularly in the context of canceled or
abandoned plants.13 9
The Palo Verde generating plant illustrates the typical regulatory
treatment of a plant that is jointly owned with no contractual allocation
of costs and risks. Arizona Public Service Company joined with several
13l See e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4909.15 (Page 1980); See also Note, Con-
sumer's Counsel v. Public Utilities Commission: Who Shall Bear the Cost of Abandon-
ment, 11 CAP. U.L. REv. 91, 95-96 (1981).
'" Regulators can allocate all of the costs of an abandoned plant to the utility by
allowing no portion of the investment in the plant in rates. Alternatively, they can
allocate almost all of the cost of the plant to the utility by allowing recovery of out-of-
pocket costs but disallowing all costs of capital and providing that the out-of-pocket
costs be recovered over a long amortization period. See NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLA-
TIONS, supra note 3, at 56 table 12; Missouri: Commission Denies Recovery Costs for
Nuclear Unit, 112 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 8, 1983, at 52; North Carolina Modifies
Abandonment Loss Policy, 112 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 24, 1983, at 66.
135 See P.L. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, DEREGULATION OF ELECTRIC
POWER: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 63-65 (1982).
138 See Willrich & Kubitz, Why Not Regional Electric Power Generation Compa-
nies?, 111 PuB. UTIL. FORT., June 9, 1983, at 25.
"" See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 547 (Ariz.
Corp. Comm'n 1980).
138 See, e.g., South Dakota Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982);
see also infra note 147 and accompanying text.
1'9 See generally NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 44-45 table
10 (of 47 state commission decisions dealing with cancellation or abandonment costs
exceeding $50 million, 20 involved multijurisdiction plants).
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California utilities to build a nuclear generating plant. 40 When the
California regulatory authorities made clear that they would not accord
favorable treatment to the California utilities' share of the multijuris-
diction project, those utilities withdrew, and the project was canceled.
141
The Arizona utility then attempted to recover its investment in the
canceled plant through a multiyear amortization, but, in Arizona Pub-
lic Service Co., the Arizona Commission disallowed the utility's invest-
ment in the canceled plant. The Commission interpreted Arizona's stat-
ute as forbidding any recovery of investments in assets that never
become used and useful.142 It noted that the sole reason for cancellation
of the plant was a change in California regulatory conditions. 3 Thus,
it apparently based its decision partly on the principle that Arizona
ratepayers should not be required to pay costs attributable to the regu-
latory policies of other states. 44 The Commission emphasized that Ari-
zona Public Service Company could have protected itself by entering
into contracts allocating the risks of cancellation to the cosponsoring
California utilities.
45
The Tyrone generating plant illustrates the regulatory treatment
of a plant that is owned by a single company subject to contracts allo-
cating risks among several utilities. The plant was cosponsored by affil-
iated companies providing electricity to four states: Wisconsin, Minne-
sota, North Dakota, and South Dakota.' 46 The plant was owned by the
company serving Wisconsin, the state in which the plant was to be lo-
cated, but the costs associated with the plant were allocated contractu-
ally among the sponsoring companies in proportion to the percentage of
the generating capacity that was to be allocated to each.' 47 The Wis-
140 See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 547, (Ariz. Corp.
Comm'n 1980).
141 Id. at 556.
142 Id. at 547.
148 Id. at 556.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32 (N.D. 1981).
147 See Northern States Power Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339, 358
(Minn. P.U.C. 1981). The Minnesota Commission described the allocation agreement
as follows:
[The] agreement was designed to apportion joint costs of generating facili-
ties between the two corporate entities. Costs of production, transmission,
and related operating and maintenance are shared based upon predeter-
mined ration [sic] set so that the costs assumed by each company reflect
the demand and energy requirements each company imposes on the inte-
grated system. Fixed costs are split between the companies based upon a
rolling average ratio developed from coincident summer and winter peak
demands from the preceding four years plus one projected year.
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consin company received advance approval to construct the plant from
the Wisconsin Commission.1"" The Wisconsin Commission, however,
subsequently reversed its position and denied the company permission
to construct and operate the plant.149 The Wisconsin company then de-
cided to abandon the plant and filed requests for rate increases to re-
flect amortization of its investment in the plant.1 50 The request for rate
increases to cover the portion of the canceled plant contractually allo-
cated to the companies serving the other three states was filed with the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).5 That rate increase
request was subject to FERC jurisdiction, rather than state jurisdiction,
because it involved sales for resale in interstate commerce regulated by
the Federal Power Act. 52 FERC found the utility's decisions prudent,
and, in accordance with its standard policy on investments in canceled
plants,153 it granted the rate increase to the extent necessary to permit
the company to amortize its investment, including AFUDC, over a ten-
year period. 5
The companies that were required to pay the rate increase result-
ing from the FERC action filed companion rate increase requests with
the state commissions that regulate rates in the states they serve: Min-
nesota, South Dakota, and North Dakota. The Minnesota155 and
North Dakota 56 Commissions refused to grant the rate increase re-
quests. The reasoning of the Minnesota Commission is illuminating.
The Commission rested its adverse decision on two grounds. First, the
Minnesota Commission concluded that the Wisconsin Commission's de-
nial of permission to complete and operate the plant was erroneous.15
Second, the Minnesota Commission concluded that, in any event, rate-
payers in one state should not be required to pay for the consequences
of decisions by regulatory agencies in other states.158 The rate orders of
148 Id. at 359.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 See Northern States Power Co., [1979-1982 Transfer Binder] UTIL. L. REP.
(CCH) % 12,516, at 15,983 (F.E.R.C. 1981), affd sub nom. South Dakota Util.
Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982).
152 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824k (1982).
153 See Northern States Power Co., [1979-1982 Transfer Binder] UTIL. L. REP.
(CCH) 12,516, at 15,987 (F.E.R.C. 1981).
I" FERC's decision was upheld by the Eighth Circuit in South Dakota Util.
Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982).
155 Northern States Power Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339 (Minn. P.U.C.
1981).
156 See Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32, 38 (N.D. 1981).
157 Northern States Power Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339, 360 (Minn.
P.U.C. 1981).
158 Id.
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both the Minnesota and North Dakota commissions were reversed on
appeal. The reviewing courts reasoned that once FERC declares a rate
just and reasonable, a state commission is precluded by the supremacy
clause from characterizing that rate as anything but a reasonable oper-
ating expense which the purchasing utility must be permitted to recover
in its rates.1 59
These cases suggest that when multijurisdiction plants are in-
volved, the sponsoring utilities can choose, through the ownership struc-
ture they employ, to subject themselves either to FERC rate regulation
or to state rate regulation.'
F. Summary of Regulatory Issues
It is useful at this point to summarize briefly the types of decisions
routinely made by regulatory commissions in connection with major en-
ergy projects. First, some commissions, although not all, have the power
to approve or disapprove projects in advance. Second, many, although
not all, commissions that have the power to approve projects in advance
also have the power to order partially completed projects canceled or
completed projects abandoned.
Third, whether or not a commission has direct regulatory power
over a project before its completion, the commission often decides rate
issues related to a project after completion. If the project results in ex-
cess capacity, the commission must decide whether to grant a large rate
increase by allowing inclusion of the entire investment in rate base.
Many commissions permit complete inclusion, but some exclude that
portion of the investment in the project that represents excess capacity,
and some impose a different form of financial penalty on excess
capacity.
Fourth, commissions frequently must determine the proper regula-
159 Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Northern States Power Co., Docket No. Cl-
82-1131 (Minn. 1983) (unanimous decision); Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen,
314 N.W.2d 32, 38 (N.D. 1981); see also Northern States Power Co., 328 N.W.2d 852
(S.D. 1983) (South Dakota Commission did not abuse its discretion when it deferred
decision on rate increase application covering losses resulting from Tyrone cancellation
until FERC had determined the amount of the loss.).
160 Multijurisdiction plants frequently are sponsored by utilities that are members
of the same corporate family. See, e.g., South Dakota Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690
F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982). This sort of arrangement may cause particularly intense
disputes between states. The states' ordinary concerns are heightened by the realization
that the intracorporate contracts are not the products of arms-length negotiations in
which each utility is primarily concerned with protecting its own interests and those of
its ratepayers. On the contrary, such contracts are designed to further the common
interests of the affiliated companies in maximizing the net return of the corporate
family.
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tory treatment of investments in projects that are canceled or aban-
doned. A few commissions allow recovery of the entire investment, in-
cluding the cost of capital associated with the investment, through
multiyear amortization. A majority permits recovery only of the out-of-
pocket costs of the investment, excluding at least a portion of the cost of
capital. This treatment has the effect of allocating the costs of the in-
vestment between the utility and consumers in a way that places from
fifty to one hundred percent of the burden on the utility, depending
principally on the amortization period prescribed.""' A growing minor-
ity disallows recovery of all of a utility's investment in a canceled or
abandoned plant.
Fifth, commissions must make decisions in connection with mul-
tijurisdiction plants and contend with the fact that, by carefully struc-
turing multijurisdiction projects, utilities can deliberately exclude state
commissions from involvement in decisions concerning the rate treat-
ment of completed, canceled, or abandoned projects.
Each of these decisions is interrelated. For instance, a state that
prohibits recovery of all investments in canceled plants but permits a
rate of return on completed plants that constitute excess capacity cre-
ates an incentive to complete a plant whether it is needed or not.1 2 A
state that disallows investments in excess capacity but permits recovery
of investments in canceled plants creates an incentive to cancel a plant
if there is any likelihood that its completion will result in excess capac-
ity.163 A state that precludes recovery of investments in canceled plants
and disallows investments in excess capacity creates a third type of in-
centive: to refrain from constructing a new plant until there is absolute
certainty that a new plant is needed. 1"
These examples are merely illustrative of some of the links be-
tween the decisions of regulators and the decisions of utilities. Some of
the other relationships between the powers of commissions and the de-
cisions of utilities are less obvious. The presence or absence of commis-
sion power to approve plants in advance or to order cancellation of
plants under construction affects a commission's discretion to accord
completed or canceled plants unfavorable rate treatment. 6 5 The ability
of the utilities to avoid state commission jurisdiction over the rate treat-
ment of completed and canceled plants adds a critical dimension that
161 See NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 56 table 12; see also
supra text accompanying notes 119-25.
"' See infra text following note 229.
l See infra text accompanying note 229.
' See infra text accompanying note 230.
161 See infra text accompanying note 208.
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affects the incentives of both the utilities and the states that have pri-
mary responsibility for their regulation."l 8 These relationships do
demonstrate, however, that the problems of preventing mistakes in ret-
rospect, and of correcting those that occur, are inexorably connected
with the regulatory process itself.
Before beginning detailed analysis of each of the pieces of this
complicated regulatory puzzle, it is useful to contrast the general char-
acteristics of a hypothetical competitive market in electricity with the
operation of the current system of regulation. By doing so, one can illu-
minate the distinctive characteristics of regulatory decisionmaking and
how they bear on the problem of mistakes in retrospect.
III. MARKET TREATMENT VERSUS REGULATORY TREATMENT
How would a competitive market allocate the risks of mistakes in
retrospect? The answer to this question may provide some insights into
the question of how regulatory commissions should treat excess capacity
and canceled plants. Some commentators have proposed deregulation of
electric generation, 67 and others have proposed solutions within the
regulatory scheme that would simulate the effects of an unregulated
market.1 68 Even if competition cannot be substituted for regulation in
the electricity industry, the expected performance of a competitive mar-
ket can be used as a benchmark for comparison with the results of
alternative regulatory solutions.
A competitive market does not forgive mistakes in forecasting de-
mand or in projecting the costs of alternative means of providing ser-
vice, however understandable those mistakes may be. The market pro-
vides rewards and penalties based on conditions ex post, not reasonable
expectations ex ante. An industry with substantial excess capacity, like
today's electric generating industry, would have no choice but to lower
its prices. In a competitive market, firms operating with excess capacity
do not earn a return on that capacity. Nor do firms that cancel partially
completed plants because of unanticipated shortfalls in demand recover
their investments in the plants. Further, if firms in a competitive mar-
ket rely upon a promising technology that unexpectedly becomes more
I6 See infra text accompanying note 246.
67 See, e.g., Miller, A Needed Reform of the Organization and Regulation of the
Interstate Electric Power Industry, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 635 (1970); Weiss, Antitrust
in the Electric Power Industry, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MAR-
KETS 135 (A. Phillips ed. 1975); Essay, Efficiency and Competition in the Electric
Power Industry, 88 YALE L.J. 1511 (1979).
168 See, e.g., A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND IN-
STITUTIONS (1970).
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expensive than alternative technologies, those firms experience reduced
rates of return to the extent of the difference in cost of the two technol-
ogies. The harsh consequences of misjudgments in the competitive mar-
ket provide powerful incentives for prudent decisionmaking. If a firm's
forecasts are wrong, it suffers. If its forecasts bias the outcome, it suf-
fers. Thus, it has a natural incentive to invest heavily in forecasting and
to purge its forecasts of all sources of bias.
Many electric utilities have substantial excess capacity at pre-
sent,1 69 and, judging from the enormous rate increases sought to reflect
the costs of completing new nuclear generating plants,170 many utilities
have invested in a technology more expensive than alternative technolo-
gies. Under these circumstances, a regulatory policy that simulated the
responses of the competitive market would require uniform denial of all
rate increases requested to reflect new plants that constitute excess ca-
pacity or to permit recovery' of investments in canceled plants. Through
this policy, regulatory commissions would replicate the harsh treatment
accorded by a competitive market to firms that overbuild or that select
inappropriate technologies based on inaccurate forecasts. This, in turn,
would provide powerful natural incentives for utilities to make invest-
ment decisions based upon carefully conceived forecasts of future
conditions.
This policy prescription is particularly appealing when attention is
turned to the possibility that regulation itself distorts utility investment
decisions. 171 If Averch and Johnson are right, cost-of-service rate regu-
lation sometimes gives utilities an incentive to overinvest in capital as-
sets.1 72 Utilities, therefore, have a regulatory incentive to use forecasting
methodologies biased in favor of the need for investments in new capac-
ity, particularly capital-intensive new capacity. The forecasts actually
used by the industry as the basis for investment decisions appear to
reflect bias or, at the least, naivete in assumptions with respect to long-
term price elasticity of demand for electricity173 and structural changes
in the market for electricity.
17 4
169 See POWER MONTHLY, supra note 28, at 87-91.
170 See supra notes 48 & 89.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
12 See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
'7 The utility industry consistently overestimated the rate of growth in peak load
by a wide margin from 1973 through 1983. Compare NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLA-
TIONS, supra note 3, at 16 table 5 (growth forecasts generally in excess of seven percent
annually) with POWER ANNUAL, supra note 27, at 47. See generally Studness, supra
note 26, at 54-55 (suggesting that industry forecasts underestimated the impact on de-
mand made by the substantial increases in electric utility rates that occurred between
1973 and 1983).
1 See Johnson, Why Electric Power Growth Will Not Resume, 111 PUB. UTIL.
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Before embracing fully this application of competitive market
principles and denying many pending utility rate increases, it is neces-
sary to determine whether a particular utility's system is characterized
by the conditions hypothesized. As the title of this Article and the text
so far suggest, the author strongly believes that many utilities have
overinvested in capacity and have selected capital-intensive forms of ca-
pacity that do not represent the least cost alternative. This belief is
critical to the appeal of denying rate increase requests in order to create
incentives equivalent to those provided by a competitive market. If a
nuclear power plant nearing completion today is not a mistake in retro-
spect, a competitive market would not penalize the utility for investing
in the plant.
The evidence that the electricity industry has chronic excess capac-
ity is powerful but not irrefutable. The industry reserve margin for
1983 (generating capability minus peak demand) is thirty-two per-
cent,175 well above the margin required for reliable provision of electric
service." 6 In an industry with indivisible increments of capacity and
long lead times for new capacity, however, the present reserve margin
is less important than the expected future margin. There is room for
honest difference of opinion concerning the future supply/demand rela-
tionship in the industry. Although many experts forecast excess capac-
ity for the indefinite future,17 their views are not shared by all. The
Department of Energy, for instance, predicts capacity shortages within
a decade." 8 The Department of Energy forecast may be challenged as
FORT., Apr. 14, 1983, at 19, 20 (structural changes include: "[a] long-term evolution in
the nature of the domestic economy and its use of electricity, [c]hanges in the mix of
U.S. and world industrial production, [s]aturation of electrical devices in the residential
and commercial sectors, [and] [rieversal of long-term trends in the real price of
electricity").
'15 Franklin, A Fresh Look at Electric Generating Reserve Margins, 111 PUB.
UTL. FORT., Apr. 28, 1983, at 17, 19 exhibit 2. The industry should not have a
reserve margin greater than about 21%. S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGU-
LATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 105-07 (1974).
At least one study has estimated that reserve capacities even more excessive than
those at present will exist in the 1990's. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 2, at 19.
176 Studies of the industry have concluded that the requisite reserve margin is
between 16% and 21%. See S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY, supra note 175, at 105-07.
177 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ENERGY CONSERVATION AND POWER, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY LOAD FORECASTING
(1983) [hereinafter cited as LOAD FORECASTING]. In comparison to actual need, recent
load forecasts have been too high. Some analysts predict that United States energy
needs will continue to decrease; this reduction, combined with excessive forecasting, will
result in increased reserve margins. See id. app. IV at 22, 33-36.
178 OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, RE-
PORT OF THE ELECTRICITY POLICY PROJECT, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC POWER IN
AMERICA: ECONOMIC SUPPLY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH (1983) [hereinafter cited as
1984]
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based on highly questionable assumptions,179 but when all is said and
done there is no way to be certain about what the future demand will
be for electricity. 8
A similar picture emerges from a comparison of the cost of elec-
tricity generated in new nuclear power plants with the cost of electricity
from new and existing fossil fuel plants. Judged solely by the magni-
tude of rate increase requests attributable to new nuclear plants, elec-
tricity generated in such plants appears to be a very bad bargain
indeed.
The initial cost of a new capital-intensive plant is, however, a poor
indicator of its overall economic benefits or detriments. The traditional
method of regulating utility rates contains a large temporal bias that
causes the cost of capital investments to be allocated disproportionately
to the early years of an asset's life. 81 In the case of assets as expensive
and long-lived as nuclear power plants, this bias has a distortive effect
on utility rates so powerful that rate increases attributable to comple-
tion of such a plant may mask the fact that the plant will provide sub-
stantial net economic benefits over time.
18 2
The temporal bias that causes large rate increases in the early
years of a plant's life also causes rate decreases in later years.18 The
capital cost component of the utility's rates declines as the amount of
the original cost of the investment remaining in the utility's rate base
declines. Thus, the only reliable method of determining whether a new
plant is economically superior to an alternative means of providing
electricity is to compare the cost of each (discounted to present value)
over the life of the plant. This, however, forces a return to the problem
of the uncertain future.
Nuclear power plants have high capital costs and low operating
THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC POWER] (proceeds from the office's "financially con-
strained electric supply scenario" to analyze how a continuation of recent supply trends
could affect the reliability and cost of electric service in the future).
178 See LOAD FORECASTING, supra note 177, at 22.
150 In fact, the Department of Energy, just one year ago, predicted significant
increases in existing excess capacity. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 2, at 19
(additions to generating capacity are expected to result in national reserve margins of
45% in 1985, 42% in 1990, and 45% in 1995).
181 Navarro, Petersen & Stauffer, A Critical Comparison of Utility-Type Ratemak-
ing Methodologies in Oil Pipeline Regulation, 12 BELL J. EcON. 392, 395 (1981).
182 See POWER REGULATION, supra note 44, at 191-98, 205-22. That report sug-
gests that, because they have lower capital construction costs than nuclear plants, fossil
fuel plants may initially appear more attractive. The increase in the rate base that
results when a fossil fuel plant comes on line is much smaller than the increase associ-
ated with a nuclear plant. In reality, the report concludes, the much lower operating
costs of the nuclear plant make it economically preferable under any long-term
analysis.
183 See Navarro, Petersen, & Stauffer, supra note 181.
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costs relative to fossil fuel plants."' The economic advantages or disad-
vantages of nuclear power plants are critically sensitive to future prices
of fossil fuels. Many forecasts predict that fossil fuel prices will remain
stable or increase slightly, in constant dollars, for the foreseeable fu-
ture."85 If those forecasts are accurate, investments in new nuclear
power plants to replace existing fossil fuel plants, or even in lieu of
new fossil fuel plants, are indeed mistakes in retrospect. If, however,
forecasts of substantial future increases in fossil fuel prices, such as the
forecasts emanating from the Department of Energy,188 are accurate,
new nuclear plants may still be good investments. This author believes
that fossil fuel prices are likely to remain relatively stable for the fore-
seeable future, but the uncertainty inherent in any forecast of future
fossil fuel prices is so great that it is impossible to be confident of any
prediction. Consider, for instance, the potential ramifications of any
war-related closure of the Straits of Hormuz.
All of the prior discussion relates only to the factual predicates of
regulatory decisions. The policy prescription could and must be made
contingent upon resolution of these difficult factual problems by regula-
tory commissions. Thus, if the harsh market analogue is to be adopted,
it should take the form of a contingent direction to a regulatory com-
mission. Such a direction could be stated as follows: If the commission
finds that a utility has made an investment decision that is imprudent
in retrospect, the utility shall not be entitled to a rate increase attributa-
ble to such investment, but shall be entitled to whatever rate increase it
would have received if it had made decisions consistent with accurate
forecasts of future conditions. This direction would leave regulatory
commissions the imposing responsibility of determining whether past
investments were prudent based on present conditions and expected fu-
ture conditions, but it would at least provide clear guidance concerning
the appropriate regulatory treatment of any investment that is found to
be imprudent in retrospect.
184 See supra note 73.
185 Energy Analyst Says Crude Oil Prices Will Not Fluctuate Significantly to
2000, 11 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 1143, 1143 (Dec. 8, 1983); see also World
Petroleum Congress Report: Energy Demand, Supply, and Needed Development Re-
sources Are Assessed, OIL & GAS J., Sept. 5, 1983, at 71-72. Although cautioning that
prices are hard to predict, John H. Lichtblau of the Petroleum Industry Research
Foundation, Inc., based his presentation "Oil's role in the energy future," on the as-
sumption that the average world oil price, which was $29 per barrel as of March 1983,
will remain "nominally" unchanged through 1984, will rise somewhat less than infla-
tion in the principal importing countries until the late 1980's, and then rise approxi-
mately in line with inflation until 2000.
"' The United States Department of Energy predicts that "petroleum (and most
of the readily available substitute fuels) will continue to become more expensive for
some time to come." U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at 2.
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Under this approach, investments in canceled plants invariably
would be excluded from rates because such investments are, by defini-
tion, imprudent in retrospect. The treatment of new plants would de-
pend upon the precise facts found by the agency. Two examples illus-
trate this point. First, if the commission were to find that a utility acted
imprudently in retrospect by constructing a new plant five years before
the plant's capacity was needed, the commission would not allow the
utility's investment in the plant to be included in rate base for five
years. If the utility were able to use the plant during that five-year
period in a manner that reduced its operating costs, it would be entitled
to charge rates at a level determined as if such reductions in operating
costs had not occurred. Second, if the commission were to find that a
utility built a nuclear plant when, in retrospect, it should have built a
coal-fired plant, the utility would be allowed to include in its rate base
only the portion of its actual investment equivalent to the capital cost of
a coal-fired plant. Again, however, the utility would be entitled to re-
tain in its rates any economic benefits attributable to the decision to
invest in a nuclear plant instead of a coal-fired plant. Thu§, for in-
stance, the company would be allowed rate increases to the extent of
the difference between the actual cost of operating the nuclear plant
and the higher cost of operating a coal-fired plant. In this way, the
utility could receive the same treatment from regulatory commissions
that it would receive were it in a competitive market. As a result, the
utility would be subject to the same powerful incentives to avoid exces-
sive or inappropriate investments premised on faulty projections as are
participants in competitive markets.
Before the market analogue is accepted as the basis for regulatory
treatment of mistakes in retrospect, it is important to determine
whether there are characteristics of either regulation or competitive
markets that would cast doubt upon the functional efficacy of the ana-
logue. Despite the fact that the market analogue seems to offer promise
in the treatment of mistakes in retrospect, this problem is only one of
many presented to regulatory bodies. Mixing market-based sanctions
with regulatory constraints can yield a combination of legal and eco-
nomic regimes worse than the pure version of each.
When a participant in a competitive market makes an investment,
the participant does so with full recognition of the potential losses
which may result from differences between actual future market condi-
tions and the forecast market conditions on which the profitability of
the investment was premised. It also undertakes an investment in a new
plant based on the expectation that market conditions more favorable
than forecast will produce an even better rate of return than expected.
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Indeed, the firm forecasts a range of foreseeable market conditions and
calculates the corresponding range of potential rates of return on the
investment.1 87 It then calculates the weighted average rate of return
and, after adjusting the weighted average rate of return to reflect the
risk factor associated with the variation in the potential rate of return,
it invests in the new plant only if the risk-adjusted weighted average
rate of return exceeds the firm's cost of capital. 88 In the case of long-
lived investments undertaken by financially sound firms, the expected
rate of return during any given period is not crucial, since a period of
low or negative return can be offset by a period of very high return.
Firms subject to cost-of-service rate regulation cannot approach in-
vestment decisions in the same manner. If market conditions yield a
potential rate of return on investment in excess of the "normal" level, a
utility is still limited to the rate of return allowed by the regulatory
commission. 89 This holds true for the entire life of the, investment,
thereby reducing substantially the expected weighted average rate of
return a regulated utility can expect. This upper limit on rate of return
also applies to any particular period in which market conditions other-
wise would permit the utility to earn a high rate of return in order to
offset periods of lower-than-expected earnings.
Thus, combining market-based sanctions for unwise investments
with regulatory constraints on the rate of return that a utility can earn
on particularly wise investments produces an asymetrical framework
for making investment decisions.' 90 This asymmetry does more than
just offend a lawyer's traditional notion of fairness. There is every rea-
son to expect that it will yield a pattern of utility investment decisions
that would cause enormous harm to consumers and to the economy.
Combining the present regulatory ceiling on return on utility in-
vestments with the complete exposure of such investments to losses at-
tributable to changes in market conditions would discourage utility in-
vestments in new plants. The utility would have to be very nearly
certain that new capacity was needed before it would be willing to in-
vest in such capacity. When in doubt regarding future conditions, the
utility would decide not to build a new plant. As a result, consumers
1'7 See H. LEVY & M. SARNAT, CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL DECI-
SIONS 188-203 (1978); H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES
ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY 86-94 (1970); J.F. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM,
MANAGERIAL FINANCE 314-17, 323-35, 354-61 (6th ed. 1978).
188 See H. LEVY & M. SARNAT, supra note 187, at 190-92; H. RAIFFA, supra
note 187, at 90-94; J.F. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 187, at 322-35.
"" See E. GELLHORN & R.J. PIERCE, supra note 74, at 98-99.
180 See Pierce, Natural Gas Rate Design: A Neglected Issue, 31 VAND. L. REV.
1089, 1154-55 (1978).
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would be exposed to substantial risks of increased rates attributable to
more intensive use of generating units with high operating costs and
continued use of obsolete units, as well as the increased risk of brown-
outs and blackouts caused by inadequate capacity.
Thus, a direct carryover of market-based sanctions for imprudent
investments undertaken by regulated utilities is not a promising solu-
tion to mistakes in retrospect. Analogies to the competitive markets,
however, may be useful in identifying solutions to the regulatory
problems created by mistakes in retrospect. Successful treatment of
these problems, however, requires an approach that is either less direct
or more complete than combining market-based penalties with rewards
that are severely limited by regulation.
IV. THE MAJOR REGULATORY QUESTIONS IN DETAIL
Part II consisted of a description of the five questions that arise
most frequently with respect to utility decisions to invest in major new
plants: whether to approve new plants in advance, whether to order
cancellation of previously approved plants, what the appropriate rate
treatment is for investments in new plants that result in excess capacity,
what the appropriate rate treatment is for investments in canceled or
abandoned plants, and how to handle conflicts concerning multijurisdic-
tion plants. In this part, each of these questions will be analyzed, and
the relationship between them will be made explicit.
A. The Power to Approve New Plants in Advance
Many state commissions have the power to approve in advance
proposals by utilities to construct major new plants. 9 ' The rest do not.
Typically, the decision not to grant such authority is based on the belief
that decisions concerning investments in new plants should be left en-
tirely to the discretion of utility management.92 In recent years, how-
ever, there has been a distinct trend toward granting the authority to
certify plants to state commissions.193 At first glance, this trend may
appear progressive, but analysis of the potential ramifications of the
1 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 56 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MIcH. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 460.502 (West 1967); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 77-3-11, 77-3-21 (1973);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 162-F:6 (1977 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 68
(McKinney 1955); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-1230 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 65-4-201 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.491 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
192 See, e.g., Kelley v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 412 Mich. 385, 316 N.W.2d
187, 197-200 (1982).
193 For example, Wisconsin's certification statute was enacted in 1975. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 196.491 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
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exercise of certification powers suggests that the trend is more harmful
than beneficial.
There are two major reasons for granting commissions the power
to approve the utility's construction plans in advance. First, present
methods of rate regulation may provide a financial incentive for over-
investment in capital-intensive projects."" At least in theory, commis-
sions can act as a check on the utilities' tendency to respond to this
incentive. Second, because commissions generally become heavily in-
volved in utility investment decisions years after they are made, the
public and utilities may be better served by commission involvement in
the decisionmaking process itself. The traditional argument that deci-
sions to invest in new plants are entirely consigned to management's
discretion seems specious when commissions second-guess such deci-
sions more than a decade after they are made.
It is important, however, to recognize the limitations on the practi-
cal ability of regulatory commissions to play a constructive role in util-
ity investment decisions. Commissions do not have personnel adequate
either in numbers or in expertise to make independent forecasts of de-
mand, construction costs, cost of alternative methods of generating elec-
tricity, and the many other factors relevant to decisions to construct new
plants. Of course, they can retain outside consultants to conduct such
forecasts, but only at a very high cost. Moreover, there is no guarantee
that the presence of outsiders will improve results. Many of the deci-
sions that are now regarded as mistakes were made by government
decisionmakers: the government makes mistakes too.' 95 In short, while
granting certification authority to regulatory commissions improves the
apparent effectiveness of the regulatory process, there is little reason to
expect such a grant of authority to produce any real improvement in
the process. Regulatory commissions with the power to certify new
plants often make decisions that later prove ill-advised.' 98 A commis-
10 See Averch & Johnson, supra note 54; see also supra note 56 and text accom-
panying notes 54-56.
195 See infra note 196.
10 Indeed, government agencies may have an even worse record for overestimat-
ing future demand than do the privately owned electric utilities. The coal-gasification
plant and several liquefied natural gas import terminals thaf now seem to have been
wasteful investments were approved and encouraged by federal agencies. See supra
notes 12-14. One of the largest mistakes in forecasting future demand was made by a
public power supply agency: the Washington Public Power Supply System. See supra
note 6. The political incentive that government agencies have to overestimate demand
and thereby justify new plants may be even more powerful than the regulatory incen-
tive to overinvest in capacity faced by investor-owned utilities. See Cochrane, Energy
Policy in the Johnson Administration: Logical Order versus Economic Pluralism in
ENERGY POLICY IN PERSPECTIvE: TODAY'S PROBLEMS, YESTERDAY'S SOLUrIONS,
337, 370-75 (C. Goodwin ed. 1981); Goodwin, Truman Administration Policies To-
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sion with such power may sometimes disapprove plants that would be
of substantial public benefit. At best, the problem of basing decisions to
invest or not invest on inaccurate forecasts will be marginally amelio-
rated by giving commissions the power to approve plants in advance.
Giving a commission certification power over new plants, however,
has significant implications for other regulatory decisions that suggest
that vesting prior approval power in a commission will not solve the
problem of mistakes in retrospect. Once a commission certifies a new
plant, the utility will -have an advantage in any subsequent proceedings
concerning the appropriate rate treatment of its investment in the plant.
First, the commission can not easily exclude the plant from rate base by
applying the standard version of the prudent investment test. That test
focuses on the information available to the company at the time it made
the investment decision."' 7 Given that a commission exercising certifica-
tion power would have access to precisely the same information that the
company had, any subsequent disallowance of investment recovery
through application of the prudent investment test would be tanta-
mount to a collateral attack on the commission's own certification or-
der. The commission might still have the power to disallow some por-
tion of the investment if it concluded that the utility had been
imprudent in failing to cancel the plant at some later stage based on
changed circumstances. Such a decision would, however, also cast some
doubt on the commission's initial decision and probably would not be
resorted to at all if the commission had the continuing power to order
cancellation of a certified plant and had failed to exercise it.
Second, although it could still disallow the inclusion of plant in-
vestments in rate base under the used and useful test, a commission
with certification authority would be unlikely to do so. Once a commis-
sion has certified a plant based on a finding that the plant will be
needed in the future, any subsequent finding that the plant constitutes
excess capacity and hence should not be allowed in rate base would be
an embarrassment. Such a finding would mean that the commission's
forecasts, as well as the utility's, were in error. To avoid such embar-
rassment, the commission may be expected to strain to find the plant
used and useful when complete. In addition, a court reviewing a com-
mission decision to disallow the reflection of a new plant in rate base
may rely in part on the commission's prior approval of the plant to
reverse the commission's decision.198
ward Particular Energy Sources, in ENERGY POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE: TODAY'S
PROBLEMS, YESTERDAY'S SOLUTIONS, supra, at 63, 147, 188-92.
'0 See supra note 76 and text accompanying notes 75-81.
198 See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis. 2d
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As a result of the relationship between a commission's prior certi-
fication of plants and subsequent rate treatment of plants, utilities are
seemingly the principal beneficiaries of a grant of certification power to
a state regulatory commission. Although a certification requirement
might superficially improve the regulatory process, there is little reason
to expect that the direct involvement of commissions in investment deci-
sions would create any real improvement. Indeed, because of the rela-
tionship between direct control over investment decisions and rate treat-
ment of investments in new plants, granting a commission certification
power may provide utilities increased freedom to respond to regulatory
incentives to overinvest in capital assets.
B. The Power to Order Cancellation of Previously Approved Plants
A Commission's statutory authorization usually links the power to
approve plants in advance with the power to withdraw such ap-
proval.199 In some cases, however, commissions with certification power
have only limited power to order cancellation of a certified plant.2 00
Coupling the authority to approve new plants with only a limited au-
thority to order cancellation offers no advantages.
It is logical to conclude that a commission that has been trusted
with the power to approve new plants based on its assessment of future
conditions at the time of the initial decision to build should have the
power to change its original decision when new circumstances indicate
that the plant will not be needed. The decision to cancel involves the
same analytical process as the decision to approve.
The strange combination of certification power without cancella-
tion power can result not only from legislative proviso but also from
court decisions greatly limiting the cancellation power conferred on a
commission by statute.201 Courts may, for example, act on the fear that
256, 263-65, 325 N.W.2d 867, 870-71 (Wis. 1982).
1" State statutes provide, at most, limited revocation powers. See ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 111 2/3, § 56 (Smith-Hurd 1966) ("Such certificates may be altered or modified by
the Commission, upon its own motion .... "); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 162-F:12
(1977) ("Any certificate granted hereunder may be revoked or suspended ... [flor any
material false statement in the application, . . . [flor failure to comply with the terms
or conditions of the certificate ... [or] [flor violation of the provisions of this chapter,
regulations issued thereunder, or order of the commission."); see also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 65-4-202 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.50-.130 (West Supp. 1983-
1984).
200 See, e.g., Public Serv. Co., 122 N.H. 1062, 1066-72, 454 A.2d 435, 437-40
(1982).
201 See, e.g., id; see also Kelley v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 412 Mich. 385,
316 N.W.2d 182 (1982); Public Serv. Co. v. State, 645 P.2d 465 (Okla. 1982). But see
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 501 Pa. 153, 460 A.2d 734
19841
536 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the utility stands an unreasonable risk of losing its investment in the
plant if the commission can freely order cancellation.20 2 That the utility
should suffer loss seems unfair-and to some courts, unconstitu-
tional203-because the investment was made in reliance upon a govern-
ment decision approving the investment.
In such a case, however, even if the court's reasoning is sound, it
need not conclude that a commission lacks power to order cancellation
in order to prevent an unconstitutional "taking" of the utility's prop-
erty. Utilities ordered to cancel plants may or may not suffer financial
hardship as a result depending on a commission's decisions in subse-
quent rate cases. If the commission allows the utility to recover its in-
vestment in a subsequent rate case, the arguably unfair financial hard-
ship that concerns the court will never materialize. Even if the
commission does not allow the utility to recover its investment the result
need not be unfair to the utility: the court simply can reverse the com-
mission's ratemaking decision.2''
One court has held a cancellation order directed at a previously
certified plant unconstitutional as a prohibited taking of property with-
out just compensation. 05 The holding was premised on the belief that a
newly enacted state statute would have required the commission to dis-
allow all utility investment in a canceled plant.20 6 Even accepting the
court's conclusion that a taking did, in fact, occur, it occurred only
when the commission denied recovery of the investment pursuant to its
statutory mandate. Thus, it is the statutory provision precluding recov-
ery of the utility's investment in canceled plants, rather than the statu-
tory provision authorizing cancellation of plants, that conflicts with the
taking clause. Once it is recognized that a utility ordered to cancel a
previously certified plant must be allowed to recover its investment
through rates, there is no justification for a court's holding that a com-
mission with certification authority cannot order cancellation of a plant.
Under some circumstances, cancellation of a partially completed plant
combined with the rate increases necessary to recover the investment in
(1983) (although regulatory commission may not second-guess utility management re-
garding routine matters, it may consider the underlying need for a proposed major
capital project before approving a certificate).
'02 Public Serv. Co., 122 N.H. 1062, 1068-72, 454 A.2d 435, 439-40 (1982)
(court expressed conceirn that expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars will be
lost if compelled to cancel by an ordinance prohibiting completion of nuclear power
facility).
203 See, e.g., id.
20 See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis.2d 256,
325 N.W.2d 867 (1982).
205 Public Serv. Co., 122 N.H. 1062, 1070-72, 454 A.2d 435, 440 (1982).
20 Id.
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that plant is more beneficial to consumers than permitting the plant to
be completed.207 Any commission with the analytical capability to make
an initial certification decision can use that same capability to deter-
mine whether, under the circumstances, a plant in progress should be
completed or canceled.
Granting a commission the power to order cancellation of a previ-
ously certified plant has certain necessary implications for the rate
treatment of plants. There are a number of situations in which a com-
mission's possession of such power would tend to limit the courses of
action reasonably available when presented with requests for recovery
of the costs of canceled plants. Most obviously, a commission cannot
apply the prudent investment test to disallow recovery of the investment
in a canceled plant that was both certified and canceled by the commis-
sion. Similarly, a commission should not be able to disallow rate base
treatment of an investment in a completed plant through application of
the prudent investment test when the commission approved the plant
initially and subsequently declined to exercise its continuing power to
order cancellation of the plant.
A commission with both certification power and cancellation
power may also have difficulty disallowing capital investments under
the used and useful test. If a plant has been initially certified and then
subsequently canceled by commission order, a reviewing court is more
likely to reverse a commission order denying the utility permission to
recover its investment. Taken together, the commission's actions would
seem so manifestly unfair that the rate order could be characterized as
arbitrary and capricious, and even unconstitutional.
The commission might retain the power to exclude from rate base
all or a portion of an investment in a completed plant through applica-
tion of the used and useful test. It is possible for the decision to certify a
plant to be correct, and the continuing decision not to order cancellation
of the plant to be correct, and for the plant nonetheless to result in
excess capacity at the time it is completed. This can result when cir-
cumstances change during the construction period, at a rate that causes
the present value of the expected benefits of the plant to exceed the cost
of completing the plant at each stage of the construction process. In all
probability, however, a commission that has approved a plant and de-
clined to exercise its power to cancel the plant will be less likely to
conclude that the plant should be excluded from rate base because it is
not useful. In addition, courts might be more likely to reverse a com-
'07 See supra note 70 and text accompanying notes 70-73.
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mission in this circumstance." °"
C. Rate Treatment of Completed Plants That Result in Excess
Capacity
Since the authority to certify and to cancel new plants cannot be
relied upon as an adequate means of limiting a utility's power to re-
spond to the regulatory incentive to overinvest in capacity, careful rate
treatment of completed and canceled plants takes on added significance.
Careful regulatory review of rate increase applications that seek the
inclusion in rate base of plants that create excess capacity could poten-
tially provide an incentive to make investment decisions based on relia-
ble forecasts.
Of the two tests commonly used to determine the appropriate rate
treatment of new plants creating excess capacity, the used and useful
test in some form holds far more promise than does the prudent invest-
ment test.20 9 Although the prudent investment test is appealing in the-
ory, its practical usefulness is limited for a number of reasons. First,
where the commission has the power to certify and cancel plants, it
will, in most instances, have been so heavily involved in the decision to
build and continue building a particular plant, that the prudent invest-
ment test will be worthless as a means of checking the utilities.21 0
Given the present trend toward granting state commissions broad certi-
fication powers, the prudent investment test will soon apply to very few
significant investments. Even when the prudent investment test could
potentially be applied to an investment decision, the difficulty of prov-
ing that any important utility decision was imprudent when made is so
great that participants in rate cases rarely will spend the millions of
dollars necessary to have any chance of establishing imprudence. The
test should continue to exist to cover the unusual circumstance in which
utility decisions are obviously negligent, but it cannot be relied upon as
a real check on the incentives of regulated utilities to overinvest in ca-
pacity. On the other hand, the used and useful test can be applied to
excess capacity situations in a variety of ways.2 11 Thus, attention
should be directed to the question of how commissions can use the flex-
ibility provided by the used and useful test to create the optimum in-
centives for utility forecasting and investment decisions. This question
8 See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis. 2d
256, 325 N.W.2d 867 (1982).
209 See supra text accompanying notes 75-88.
210 See supra text accompanying note 197.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 83-109.
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has several components.
First, it is necessary to define excess capacity carefully.212 A utility
does not have excess capacity merely because it has capacity greater
than its peak demand. Reliability considerations require capacity in ex-
cess of peak demand to cover scheduled plant outages and forced out-
ages. The reserve margin adequate for this purpose varies among utili-
ties depending on many factors: size, age, and type of generating plants;
availability of power from external sources; and the nature of the mar-
ket served by the utility.
2 13
Second, capacity in excess of the necessary reserve margin is desir-
able in some situations because of indivisibilities in generating incre-
ments and large economies of scale in generation. To illustrate this
point, consider the example of a geographically isolated utility with
projected peak demand of 3,000 megawatts, present generating capacity
of 2,800 megawatts, and a planned reserve margin of twenty percent.
To have the proper capacity, the utility should build a plant with a
capacity of 800 megawatts. Yet, full economies of scale may not be
achieved in a plant with less than 1,000 megawatts of capacity.
214
The utility is thus faced with a choice of three less than ideal al-
ternatives. First, it can build a plant with 800 megawatts of capacity,
thereby maintaining its capacity at the ideal level but foregoing availa-
ble economies of scale. Second, it can defer building any plant until it
forecasts a future capacity deficiency large enough to warrant construc-
tion of a 1,000 megawatt plant, thereby avoiding excess capacity and
taking advantage of all available economies of scale, but exposing con-
sumers to the threat of rate increases and the risk of brownouts and
blackouts attributable to several years of operating with an inadequate
reserve margin. Third, the utility can build a 1,000 megawatt plant
immediately, thereby taking advantage of all available economies of
scale and avoiding the risks associated with an inadequate reserve mar-
gin but creating excess capacity for several years until demand grows
by another 200 megawatts. 1 ' Overall, the utility's customers may be
best served by a deliberate decision to create excess capacity. A commis-
sion must, therefore, be careful to avoid penalizing a utility for "excess
capacity" resulting from this type of rational decisionmaking.
Even after taking into account the need for an adequate reserve
212 See Franklin, supra note 175, at 17.
213 See Baldwin, Reserve Sharing Is Primary Benefit from Power Pooling, 70
POWER ENGINEERING, Apr. 1966, at 59, 59.
214 See 2 COSTS OF ELECTRICITY, supra note 2, at 103, 106.
21' There is an additional alternative: the utility could contract with neighboring
utilities to pool resources and build a plant whose capacity could be shared. See infra
text accompanying notes 234-37.
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margin and for planned increments of temporary excess capacity result-
ing from rational economic tradeoffs, many utilities today have substan-
tial excess capacity. 216 That is, they have capacity in excess of any level
that could result from rational decisionmaking based on the actual pre-
sent characteristics of their markets. This is the type of excess capacity
that can only be explained as a product of inaccurate forecasts. The
magnitude of the forecasting error suggests, in many cases, that the
utility either devoted insufficient resources to forecasting or responded
to the regulatory incentive to overinvest in capital assets by using fore-
casting methods that were skewed so as to lead to the conclusion that
the utility needed additional capacity. In either case, the rate treatment
of substantial excess capacity should help create incentives for utilities'
to base investment decisions on reliable forecasts. The available options
range from the allowance of all excess capacity in rate base, subject
only to the unlikely possibility of a finding of imprudence at one ex-
treme, to the disallowance of all excess capacity in rate base at the
other extreme.2 17 Both extremes should be rejected.
Obviously, inclusion of all excess capacity in rate base provides no
check on the regulatory incentive to overinvest in capital assets. If the
used and useful test is not available to restrain the utilities from re-
sponding to this incentive, the commission will have no tools except
whatever direct control it is able to exert over investment decisions
through its power to certify and cancel plants and its power to exclude
plants from rate base through the prudent investment test. Neither pro-
vides a reliable means of limiting the ability of utilities to respond to
the regulatory incentive to overinvest in capital-intensive capacity.21
Exclusion of all excess capacity from rate base would produce even
worse results. As the prior analysis of the market analogue indicates,219
this draconian remedy would create a powerful incentive for utilities to
underinvest in capacity, a consequence more costly than overinvestment
in capacity.220
The Iowa Commission may have identified the most promising ap-
proach to the difficult problem of regulatory treatment of excess capac-
216 Compare Franklin, supra note 175, at 20 (1983 reserve margin was 32%) with
S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY, supra note 175, at 105-07 (required reserve margin is
approximately 20%).
217 See supra text accompanying notes 93-114.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 191-208 & 210.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 167-90.
220 See THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 178 ("[F]ailure to pursue
economic investments in new supply will have a substantial adverse impact on electric
prices while, at the same time, increasing oil import levels and serving as a damper on
economic growth."); Navarro, supra note 56, at 31.
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ity. In Iowa Public Service Co.,221 it established a formula for reducing
a utility's rate of return by an amount proportionate to the amount of
excess capacity on the utility's system.22' This approach has the advan-
tage of permitting the Commission to impose a financial penalty that is
meaningful but less extreme than the penalty of totally disallowing ex-
cess capacity in rate base. Moreover, the size of the financial penalty
can be correlated with the magnitude of the forecasting error.
While the Iowa approach seems far superior to any alternative
attempted to date,22 it suffers from one major disadvantage. To correct
for the regulatory incentive to overinvest in capital assets without inad-
vertently creating an incentive for underinvestment in capacity, the fi-
nancial penalty for excess capacity should equal the regulatory incen-
tive to overinvest. Yet, it is impossible to calculate the magnitude of the
regulatory incentive to overinvest in capital-intensive capacity."" In-
deed, empirical data suggest that the magnitude of that incentive varies
substantially both between utilities and over time for the same util-
ity.12 Thus, the Iowa approach can do no better than impose an over-
investment penalty that crudely approximates the optimum incentives
for investment.
D. Regulatory Treatment of Canceled Plants
A commission's decision concerning the rate treatment of canceled
plants creates incentives for utility decisionmaking at two different
1211 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339 (Iowa Commerce Comm'n 1982).
222 The Commission described its formula:
The formula requires a preliminary measurement of excess capacity.
... The excess capacity is then divided by the annual peak load to give
us the per cent of excess capacity, "F." We then multiply "F" times the
net utility investment in total generating capacity to give us the utility
investment in excess capacity. The product is then multiplied by the util-
ity's weighted cost of equity to give us the shareholders' expected return
on investment in excess capacity. The weighted cost of equity (the percent-
age of common equity within the total capital structure multiplied by the
allowed return on equity) is used to avoid penalizing creditors for the
shareholders' investment decisions. We have decided the amount of return
disallowed should be directly proportional to the amount of excess capacity
so we multiply the shareholders' expected return on investment in excess
capacity times the factor "F," the per cent of excess capacity. The formula
illustrating this adjustment is shown below:
Return Adjustment=
[F (net investment in total generating capacity) (weighted cost of
common equity)] F
Id. at 370-71.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 110-14.
224 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
25 See Joskow, supra note 56, at 305-11.
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junctures: at the utility's initial decision to invest in a new plant and at
the utility's decision to cancel or to complete plants in progress. Thus,
developing a sound approach to the treatment of canceled plants is crit-
ical to the creation of a decisionmaking environment that is as free of
detrimental incentives as possible.
The commission decisions on rate treatment of investments in can-
celed plants can be divided into three general categories: decisions al-
lowing full recovery of the investment, including the utility's cost of
capital; 226 decisions allowing recovery of the out-of-pocket costs of the
investment, but denying recovery of any of the utility's cost of capital
associated with the investment;2 27 and decisions disallowing recovery of
any part of the investment.228
The first solution-allowing full recovery of the utility's invest-
ment in a canceled plant-does not respond at all to the need to
counteract the incentive to overinvest in capital assets, because it per-
mits the utility to earn a rate of return on imprudent investments equal
to the return allowed on wise investments.
Moreover, in some situations, this treatment of canceled plants
will create an incentive to cancel a plant whose completion would be
economically beneficial. 2 If a commission imposes any penalty for ex-
cess capacity while simultaneously allowing full recovery of investments
in canceled plants, it effectively tells its regulatees to cancel all partially
completed projects that might result in excess capacity. Many such par-
tially completed plants should be completed because the present value
of the economic benefits of completion exceeds the costs of completion.
The third solution-disallowing all investments in canceled
plants-produces even worse incentives. Combined with what is com-
monly the treatment of plant investments resulting in excess capac-
ity-full inclusion in rate base-the total disallowance of investment in
plants that are canceled creates an overwhelming incentive to complete
any plant in any stage of construction no matter how unnecessary that
plant might be. If the commission disallows both investments in excess
capacity and investments in canceled plants, it will, in essence, have
adopted both of the harsh market-based solutions described earlier.280
The predictable result is a powerful incentive to underinvest in capac-
ity. Even if disallowance of all investments in canceled plants were
228 For examples, see NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 49-50.
2217 For examples, see id. at 52-54.
228 See supra text accompanying notes 128-29. For examples, see NUCLEAR
PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 50-51; A Survey of Regulatory Treatment of
Plant Cancellation Costs, supra note 119, at 52, 55.
2 9 See NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 57.
20 See supra text accompanying notes 168-90.
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combined with a penalty for excess capacity less severe than complete
exclusion of excess capacity from rate base, an undesirable incentive
would be created. Because a utility would suffer a greater penalty if it
canceled a plant than if it completed the plant, the utility would have
no incentive to cancel a plant even if changed circumstances during the
construction process indicated that the plant would provide no economic
benefit. Thus, in combination with any treatment of excess capacity,
complete disallowance of investments in canceled plants is simply bad
public policy.
This analysis leaves for serious consideration only the second solu-
tion: recovery of the out-of-pocket costs of an investment in a canceled
plant, while excluding some of the utility's cost of capital associated
with the investment. This solution, combined with a reduction in a util-
ity's rate of return proportionate to the excess capacity on the system,
231
could potentially create the proper incentives for plant investment
decisions.
In sum, a utility that cancels a plant because of unanticipated
changes in circumstances should be assessed a penalty sufficient to
counteract the regulatory incentive to overinvest in capital assets. This
penalty must not be so large, however, that it creates either an incentive
to underinvest in capacity or an incentive to complete a plant whose
benefits will not be sufficient to justify its cost of completion. The dan-
ger of creating other harmful incentives is the major limitation on the
practical usefulness of the solution of allowing recovery of out-of-pocket
costs of investments in canceled plants but prohibiting recovery of some
or all of a utility's cost of capital associated with the investment. It is
impossible to determine precisely how much of a financial penalty
should be assessed for forecasting errors to produce the proper incen-
tives for capital investments.232 Hence, there is no way of determining
whether the optimum solution is to disallow recovery of the utility's
entire cost of capital, the portion of its cost of capital attributable to
equity, the portion attributable to the precancellation period, or the
portion attributable to the period of amortization of the out-of-pocket
costs. Various commissions have selected each of these different ap-
231 See supra text accompanying notes 221-25.
232 It is relatively easy to calculate the financial penalty that results from each
possible regulatory treatment of an investment in a canceled plant. See, e.g., NUCLEAR
PLANT CANCELLATIONS, supra note 3, at 56 (estimating costs by varying amount of
amortization); id. at 87-122. It is even easier to calculate the penalty for excess capacity
that results in a particular percentage reduction in the utility's rate of return under the
Iowa method. See Iowa Power & Light Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 405 (Iowa
Commerce Comm'n 1983). What is difficult is calculating the magnitude of the regula-
tory incentive to overinvest in capital assets. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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proaches to the problem of allocating the financial burden of investing
in a plant that is later canceled.2 " The ideal penalty may not necessa-
rily correspond to any of these measures, however. This lack of corre-
spondence derives from the fact that the magnitude of the ideal penalty
cannot be precisely determined because it is itself based on an indeter-
minable variable: the regulatory incentive to overinvest.
E. Regulatory Disputes Involving Multijurisdiction Plants
Plants built to meet the needs of several utilities located in differ-
ent states offer two major economic advantages. First, jointly sponsored
plants reduce the indivisibilities in the supply function of each utility.
In order to realize available economies of scale, new generating plants
must be very large: at least 1,000 megawatts.23 4 Since electricity de-
mand does not materialize in 1,000 megawatt increments, these large
economies of scale force single utilities building new generating plants
to accept one or more of three evils: excess capacity, inadequate capac-
ity, and foregone economies of scale.2 33 These evils can be avoided if
several utilities join together to build a new plant. If, for instance, four
utilities sponsor jointly a new generating plant, each can add a 250
megawatt increment of capacity without any sacrifice of economies of
scale. The economic attractiveness of jointly sponsoring new plants has
increased substantially in recent years because of the lower rate of in-
crease in demand expected by utilities. Most utilities could save them-
selves and their ratepayers several hundred million dollars a year by
building new plants jointly with neighboring utilities.
23 6
Second, jointly owned and operated generating plants can increase
the degree of coordination and joint planning among neighboring utili-
ties. Studies of the electricity industry conducted over the past twenty
years have concluded consistently that the industry could save billions
of dollars annually through increased coordination and planning.237 In
order to obtain all available economies of scale and coordination, most
new generating plants should be planned and built to serve a several-
state region.
Any new plant that is intended to serve several jurisdictions inevi-
tably will produce regulatory controversy at some point in the average
233 See supra text accompanying notes 118-34; NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLA-
TIONS, supra note 3, at 49-56.
2 See 2 COSTS OF ELECTRICITY, supra note 2, at 103, 106.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 213-15.
238 See generally Willrich & Kubitz, supra note 136, at 26-27.
237 See, e.g., S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 175, at 94-97; 2 A. KAHN,
supra note 168, at 73-75.
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twelve-year construction period. As conditions in the energy markets
represented by each state differ, and as the political conditions in each
state change, disputes will arise between the states on such critical mat-
ters as whether the plant should be completed at all and, if so, how
much of the cost and capacity of the plant should be allocated to each
state. Disputes of this nature represent a threat to the viability of all
multijurisdiction plants.
Multijurisdiction plants can be owned and operated in one of two
ways: joint ownership by all the utilities involved or ownership by a
single entity subject to contractual allocation of all benefits, costs, and
risks among the other sponsoring utilities.238 Utilities will rarely choose
joint ownership for two reasons. First, some states prohibit ownership
of utility property by citizens of other states.239 Second, if a plant is
jointly owned by several utilities, the rate treatment of each utility's
investment in the plant is dependent upon the decisions of all the other
utilities' state commissions.24° If the plant is canceled before completion
or its completion results in excess capacity, each sponsoring utility
would be exposed to significant risk of disallowance of some or all of its
investment in the plant. Some state commissions treat investments in
canceled plants less favorably than FERC does,"4 and state commis-
sions seem particularly willing to disallow investments in out-of-state
plants and plants jointly sponsored by out-of-state utilities. 42 Thus,
utilities rarely will select the joint ownership option even when legally
permitted to do so.
The other means of owning and operating a multijurisdiction
plant combines ownership of the plant by a single company with con-
tractual allocation of a portion of the capacity and costs of the plant to
each of the sponsoring utilities. The entity with title to the plant may
228 See supra text accompanying notes 137-60.
239 See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32, 33 n.2 (N.D.
19815.
240 See supra text accompanying notes 140-45.
241 FERC has adopted a policy of allowing at least partial recovery of cancellation
costs. This policy is more favorable than that adopted by some state commissions. See
supra, text accompanying notes 128-34. Compare, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 19
FERC (CCH) 61,333 (June 28, 1982) (approving settlement under which utility was
allowed to recover its costs in the canceled North Anna and Surry nuclear units over a
10-year period); and Northern States Power Co., [1979-1982 Transfer Binder] UTIL.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 12,516 (F.E.R.C. 1981) (allowing partial recovery of costs) with,
e.g., Pacific Power & Light Co., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 82, 90 (Or. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1982) (Oregon Commissioner refuses utility's request to recover investments
in canceled Pebble Springs nuclear plant over roughly a five-year period).
242 See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 547, 555-56
(Ariz. Corp. Comm'n 1980); Northern States Power Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 339, 358-62 (Minn. P.U.C. 1981); Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen, 314
N.W.2d 32, 33 (N.D. 1981).
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be either a cosponsoring utility or a separate company established for
the sole purpose of owning and operating the plant. In either case, the
contract between the owner and the sponsoring utilities allocates all
costs and risks associated with the plant, including the risk of noncom-
pletion, to each of the sponsoring utilities in return for the owner's
commitment to provide a portion of the capacity of the completed plant
to each cosponsor.2 43 The owning entity and the sponsors often are af-
filiated corporations.
244
This structure for ownership and operation of a multijurisdiction
plant creates an allocation of regulatory authority very different from
that applicable to the traditional single jurisdiction plant.245 First, be-
cause there is no federal requirement that new generating plants be
certified, the state in which the plant is to be located has the sole power
to determine whether the plant can be built or completed. If the situs
state has granted its commission the power to certify and to order can-
cellation of generating plants, that state's commission is the only agency
with power over the certification and cancellation decisions. If the situs
state has not granted its state commission power to certify and to order
cancellation of new plants, no agency has that authority, and the deci-
sion to proceed at each step lies solely in the discretion of the manage-
ment of the entity that owns the plant.
All decisions concerning the rate treatment of all the sponsoring
utilities' investments in the plant are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of FERC, since they take the form of contracts for the sale of electricity
for resale in interstate commerce.248 Once FERC allows the owner of
the plant to charge the sponsoring utilities a rate reflecting the invest-
ment in the plant, the state commissions with regulatory authority over
each sponsoring utility are required by the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution to allow each utility to recover the cost of
" See contract filed in Middle South Energy, Inc., No. ER 82-616 (F.E.R.C.
pending) (copy on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
24 See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S.
453, 456-57 (1972) (Florida Power & Light Co. is indirectly connected with out-of-
state corporations through the Florida Power Corp.); Eastern Edison Co. v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Util., 388 Mass. 292, 446 N.E.2d 684, 685-86 (1983) (Montana Electric
Co. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Eastern Edison Co.); Northern States Power Co. v.
Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32, 33 (N.D. 1981) (Northern States Power of Wisconsin is a
subsidiary of the owning entity, Northern States Power Co., and the two companies
coordinate as a single power system).
245 See supra text accompanying notes 135-60.
246 See Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32, 36-37 (N.D. 1981);
see also Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 454
(1972); Federal Power Comm'n v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 210
(1964).
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the FERC-approved rate in its retail rates.247
This allocation of regulatory authority over multijurisdiction
plants produces results that are unacceptable to most states and their
248tiregulatory commissions. Under this allocation, state commissions
have no control over the rate implications of utility decisions to con-
struct plants that create excess capacity or decisions to cancel partially
completed plants. Moreover, FERC typically decides these questions in
ways that require consumers to bear a high proportion of the economic
burden of utility investment decisions that constitute mistakes in retro-
spect. For example, FERC permits utilities to recover their investments
in canceled plants, including the precancellation costs of capital,249 and
FERC has never disallowed any portion of an investment in a new
plant merely because it resulted in excess capacity.250
State commissions also have no control over the proportion of the
costs of a multijurisdiction plant allocated to consumers in each state.
Nor can a state commission, other than the commission of the situs
state, control utility decisions to construct multijurisdiction plants or de-
cisions to complete or cancel partially completed plants. Furthermore,
the control over these decisions that can be exercised by the situs state
exposes the other states to increased risk that the situs state will make
decisions adverse to the interests of the other states.251
The dismal picture just painted is not an academician's hypotheti-
cal conflict. Wisconsin's order canceling the partially completed Tyrone
plant and FERO's order allocating most of the investment in that plant
to consumers in three other states has produced considerable conflict
among FERC, Northern States Power, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North
Dakota, and South Dakota.252 Similarly, Middle South Utilities' deci-
sion to construct the Grand Gulf plant is creating extreme tension
2417 See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 452 A.2d 375, 386
(D.C. App. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2454 (1983); Eastern Edison Co. v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Util., 388 Mass. 292, 446 N.E.2d 684, 690 (1983); Northern States
Power Co. v. Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32, 38 (N.D. 1981); Naragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke,
119 R.I. 559, 564-65, 568, 381 A.2d 1358, 1361, 1363 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
972 (1978).
248 See, e.g., Willrich & Kubitz, supra note 136, at 29 (discussing action of New
York State Commission).
249 See, e.g., Northern States Power Co., [1979-1982 Transfer Binder] UTIL. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 12,516 (F.E.R.C. 1981); Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 11 FERC
(CCH) 1 63,028 (June 2, 1980).
250 See Butler Testimony, supra note 56, at 55.
"I' See, e.g., Northern States Power Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339, 358-
62 (Minn. P.U.C. 1981).
252 See South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1982);
Northern States Power Co., 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 339 (Minn. P.U.C. 1981);
Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32 (N.D. 1981).
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among Middle South, FERC, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana.2 5
The commissions and legislatures in each of the states involved are
frustrated and outraged by their inability to exercise control over plants
that may have an enormously adverse impact on their constituents.254
They are looking for ways of avoiding any possibility that the future
fate of their ratepayers will depend entirely upon the investment deci-
sions of a regional public utility holding company and the legal deci-
sions of a faceless federal agency.2 5
The ultimate response of many states to the present allocation of
regulatory authority over multijurisdiction plants can easily be pre-
dicted. At present, utilities can insulate major investment decisions from
state regulatory power by investing in new plants through contracts
rather than through ownership. As states realize that this procedure is
the source of their regulatory impotence, they will pass legislation re-
quiring utilities subject to their jurisdiction to obtain prior approval of
the state commission before contracting to cosponsor a new plant and
pay a portion of its construction costs. State legislation purporting di-
rectly to govern existing interstate contracts allocating the costs and ca-
pacity of new plants is suspect under the supremacy clause, the com-
merce clause, and, in some cases, the contract clause of the federal
Constitution. 256 On the other hand, legislation requiring utilities subject
to the jurisdiction of a state to obtain the approval of the state commis-
sion before entering into such contracts is likely to withstand attacks
based on the federal Constitution. 5' A large number of states can be
expected to pass legislation of this type over the next few years.
Unfortunately, once a state commission has the authority to ap-
prove or disapprove in advance any utility contract to acquire generat-
ing capacity, the commission will be under considerable pressure to
1 See Simpson & Cunningham, Nuclear Plants' Energy Costs Mean Trouble for
N. 0. Area, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sept. 11, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 1, 19-21. It is
notable that Arkansas Power & Light Co. withdrew from the Grand Gulf Project in
1980; the withdrawal resulted from an inquiry by the Arkansas Attorney General's
Office, which determined that, given the estimated cost of the project, the state could
and should forego the power that the project was to have supplied.
24 See id. at 19 ("Louisiana political bodies have responded to a perceived lack of
regulation [by the Public Service Commission] by exerting some control over utilities
within their jurisdiction." New Orleans has participated in FERC proceedings regard-
ing allocation of Grand Gulf construction costs. Furthermore, a referendum was held to
decide whether or not regulation should be localized by a transfer of power from the
commission to the city council.).
255 See id. (Localization of regulatory control was proposed in order to create a
system more responsive to consumer needs.).
254 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
' See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S.Ct. 1713 (1983).
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deny all utility requests to cosponsor multijurisdiction plants. The frus-
trating experiences of the four states involved in the controversy over
the Tyrone plant and the three states now locked in battle over the
Grand Gulf plant will demonstrate to state commissions everywhere the
regulatory risks of permitting their utilities to invest in multijurisdiction
power plants.258 State commissions will be further deterred by the real-
ization that the economic disaster now unfolding in Washington, Ore-
gon, and Idaho had its genesis in contractual undertakings to purchase
the capacity of new generating plants.2"9 In that case, a large number
of utilities agreed to purchase the output of five plants to be owned and
operated by the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS).
When construction costs soared and forecast demand for electricity
failed to materialize, two of the plants were canceled, WPPSS defaulted
on 2.25 billion dollars worth of bonds, and the potential bankruptcy of
WPPSS has placed the remaining three plants in an uncertain sta-
tus. 260 This extremely complicated dispute is still in litigation, but elec-
tricity consumers in the three affected states may well be required to
absorb much of the multibillion dollar loss resulting from these utilities'
decisions to enter into contracts to cosponsor five multijurisdiction
plants.
It seems inevitable that most states will try to avoid the bitter ex-
periences of these ten states in dealing with contracts made by their
utilities to purchase capacity from multijurisdiction power plants by or-
dering utilities not to enter into such contracts. The result, however,
will be to eliminate the most promising means now available to the
electricity industry of adding generating capacity in economically effi-
cient increments. If a utility is precluded from participating in mul-
tijurisdiction plants, it must make decisions to build plants to serve only
its market. Such a utility must choose whether to subject its customers
to the risks of inadequate capacity, the costs of excess capacity, or the
costs of foregone economies of scale. 2 1 From the perspective of the in-
dividual utility system, the result will be annual electricity costs hun-
dreds of millions of dollars higher than necessary. From a national per-
spective, the result will be a net loss of social welfare of many billions
of dollars. Thus, finding a solution to the problem of disputes over new
multijurisdiction power plants must be given a high priority.
258 Even before the recent controversies concerning multijurisdiction plants, New
York refused to permit its utilities to enter into such transactions. See Willrich &
Kubitz, supra note 136, at 29.
259 See supra note 6.
260 See WPPSS Default, supra note 6, at 757-58.
261 See supra text following note 213.
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The multijurisdiction plant problem results from the present mix
of federal and state regulatory authority and the different approaches to
significant regulatory issues taken by state and federal commissions. A
substantial change in the present allocation of jurisdiction is essential to
preserve the valuable multijurisdiction option. Possible solutions lie in
three different directions: increased federal preemption; decreased fed-
eral preemption, or a new regulatory scheme tailored to multijurisdic-
tion plants. An examination of the relative strengths and weaknesses of
these three potential solutions reveals that the creation of a new regula-
tory scheme holds the most promise.
The multijurisdiction option could be preserved by decreasing state
regulatory power over utility decisions to construct or to participate in
plants. The federal government could take from the states all power to
grant certification or to order cancellation of multijurisdiction plants
located in the state. This would eliminate the risk that consumers in
other states would be injured by certification or cancellation decisions of
the situs state. Similarly, the federal government could take from the
states the power to deny their utilities permission to participate in mul-
tijurisdiction plants. The large economies of scale and economies of co-
ordination available through interstate development and operation of
generating plants makes the total federal preemption option theoreti-
cally appealing.
Unfortunately, two practical constraints override the theoretical
appeal of total federal preemption of state authority over multijurisdic-
tion plants. First, there is no reason to expect a federal agency to per-
form well in filtering out those proposed plants that will not provide
net economic benefits.2 62 Indeed, federal agencies approved in the past
some of the most glaring examples of energy projects that are today's
evident mistakes. 211 Second, Congress is not likely to take from states
the core of their traditional power to regulate electric utilities.2" Thus,
total federal preemption of state authority over decisions to construct or
to participate in multijurisdiction plants may be neither effective nor
politically realistic.
Alternatively, it might be possible to preserve the multijurisdiction
262 See supra text accompanying notes 248-50.
263 See supra note 196.
26 But see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (In the face of tenth
amendment challenges, the Supreme Court upheld Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15, 16, 30, 42 & 43 U.S.C.), which conditionally preempted certain
state regulatory functions.); see also Rotunda, The Doctrine of Conditional Preemption
and Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 289
(1983).
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plant option by reducing, rather than expanding, federal regulatory au-
thority. If state commissions were permitted to determine the rate im-
plications of utility decisions to participate in multijurisdiction plants,
they would be much more willing to approve such participation. States
could be given the power to decide whether and to what extent a utility
should be permitted to include in its retail rates costs attributable to
long-term contracts to purchase generating capacity from multijurisdic-
tion plants. If such a contractual obligation resulted in costly excess
capacity or required the utility to pay for the costs of partially complet-
ing a canceled plant, the state commission could exercise its authority to
disallow all or a portion of those costs in the utility's rates just as it
now does for investments in plants owned by the utility. This option
would also have the advantage of transferring from FERO to state
commissions at least one issue that FERO is ill-equipped to resolve:
26 5
rate treatment of excess capacity. Since FERC jurisdiction typically en-
compasses only a small portion of any utility's generating capacity,266
FERC is poorly positioned to determine whether additional generating
capacity obtained through an interstate contract to purchase capacity
from a multijurisdiction plant creates undesirable excess capacity on the
system of each participating utility.
Despite these desirable results, however, granting state commis-
sions total regulatory control over the rate implications of multijurisdic-
tion plants must be rejected because it would create regulatory risks no
utility or potential investor would be willing to assume. Adoption of
such a regulatory scheme would almost certainly create powerful incen-
tives not to use multijurisdiction plants. States would be free to disallow
recovery of all investments in canceled multijurisdiction plants and in
plants that result in excess capacity. A growing number of states are
pursuing draconian policies in the case of plants sponsored solely by
their own utilities,2 67 and one would expect that states would be even
more likely to disallow contractually based investments in multijurisdic-
tion plants of which their utilities are merely cosponsors.
First, any one of the several state commissions affected by the
plant could force its cancellation prior to completion. The commission
of the situs state could take this action directly through a cancellation
order.268 Any commission of a non situs state whose utility is partici-
285 See Butler Testimony, supra note 56, at 17-18.
26 FERO regulates only 11% to 15% of the total amount of electricity sold in the
United States. See id. at 10-11.
2'7 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
288 See, e.g., South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674, 676 (8th
Cir. 1982).
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pating in the plant could create pressure to cancel the plant by indicat-
ing its intention to disallow any or all of the costs of the plant in the
rates of the utility subject to its jurisdiction.269 This pressure would be
particularly effective in the typical case of a multijurisdiction plant that
is owned by a corporate affiliate of the utilities that have committed to
purchase the output of the plant. If the plant is canceled as a result of
regulatory action by any one state, each of the other states is likely to
exclude from the rates of its utility all contractual payments for the
canceled plant.
27 0
Second, as a matter of practical politics, the regulatory treatment
of the entire multijurisdiction plant would be determined by the af-
fected state with the most restrictive policy toward inclusion of invest-
ments in excess capacity or in canceled plants in utility rates.2" 1 Mem-
bers of utility commissions are politicians. No prudent politician would
burden his or her constituents with rate increases attributable to a plant
that a politician in a neighboring state refused to include in rates.
272
In short, a reallocation of regulatory authority over multijurisdic-
tion plants from FERC to state commissions would expose potential
sponsors of such plants to financial risks so great that no multijurisdic-
tion plants would be built.
The third possible solution to the problem of multijurisdiction
plants is to create a new regulatory scheme designed specifically to ac-
commodate the combination of jurisdictional and regulatory impedi-
ments unique to this important category of plants. Such a customized
approach would have to combine state and federal powers in ways not
previously attempted. For instance, a set of binding federal standards
for recovery of costs incurred by utilities in connection with a mul-
tijurisdiction plant could be combined with a requirement that each
utility obtain prior approval from its state for participation in the
plant.
27 3
This proposed regulatory system responds to the needs of states
26 See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 547, 555-56
(Ariz. Corp. Comm'n 1980).
270 See, e.g., id.
271 See Utility Decides to Reduce Earnings to Make Up for Losses on Nuclear
Plants, 11 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 529 (May 26, 1983) (detailing problems faced
by a utility attempting to recover lost investments in canceled plants from the regula-
tory agencies of five different states).
217 See, e.g., State's High Court Allows Utility to Recover Costs for Abandoned
Plant, 11 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 1188, 1189 (Dec. 22, 1983) (Commission had
said that consumers in Minnesota should not face a rate increase because of an aban-
donment in Wisconsin).
27. A regulatory program reflecting this type of creative federalism probably
would be held constitutional. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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and utilities. The requirement of prior state approval of each utility's
participation would eliminate much of the present state concern about
the utilities' power to determine whether and to what extent to partici-
pate in a plant without the state's consent. Once a state commission
approves a utility's participation in a multijurisdiction plant, however,
the new regulatory scheme should preclude the state from withdrawing
or modifying its approval without the consent of the other participants
in the plant. By this means, plant sponsors could be assured that the
change in heart of a single state would not result in the collapse of the
whole project.
The situs state should retain authority to approve or disapprove
the initial proposal to construct the plant in order to protect its obvious
territorial interests. Its power to order cancellation of a previously ap-
proved multijurisdiction plant should be limited, however. Because can-
cellation of a partially completed multijurisdiction plant by the situs
state could have adverse economic effects on utilities and consumers in
other states,274 the traditional unilateral power of the situs state to or-
der cancellation should be circumscribed. Yet, some government agency
should have the power to order cancellation of a partially completed
multijurisdiction plant, because circumstances can change dramatically
during the often lengthy construction period.
Because of the interstate implications of cancellation, FERC is the
most logical body to which to entrust the cancellation power. FERC
could be directed to use a fixed, objective standard in deciding whether
to order cancellation. One possible standard would be to cancel the
plant if, but only if, the present value of its expected future benefits is
less than the present value of its expected cost of completion. Alterna-
tively, FERC could be directed to make the cancellation decision as a
mechanical process derivative of the decisions of the affected states. For
example, the plant might be canceled if, but only if, states whose utili-
ties have committed to a given percentage of the plant's capacity find
that the plant should be canceled. The second alternative seems far
preferable. State commissions have superior access to data concerning
their utilities' markets and total generating capacity,2 5 and they are
usually able to resolve regulatory issues much more rapidly than
FERC.27 ' Although the decision of one state to vote to cancel would
274 See South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674, 676 (8th Cir.
1982) (after situs state ordered cancellation, allocation of costs pursuant to agreement
resulted in a one percent increase in utility rates in four other states).
275 See Butler Testimony, supra note 56, at 17.
276 See Pierce, The Choice Between Adjudicating and Rulemakingfor Formulat-
ing and Implementing Energy Policy, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1979).
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still have an effect on the other states, no one state's decision would
whipsaw the others.
Finally, state and federal regulators should share the authority to
determine the rate implications of multijurisdiction plants. States
should have some power to assess financial penalties for mistakes in
retrospect in order to provide their utilities with an appropriate incen-
tive to avoid overinvestment in capacity. Yet, sponsors of multijurisdic-
tion plants should be protected from the financial disaster that could
result from the imposition of draconian penalties by one or more of the
states affected by a multijurisdiction plant. State commissions, for in-
stance, should not be permitted to retain the power to exclude all of a
utility's investment in a canceled multijurisdiction plant because of the
powerful adverse effect that the fear of such potential regulatory action
could have on utility decisions to participate in multijurisdiction plants
and on utility decisions to complete such plants where changed circum-
stances indicate that completion would be uneconomic.17
FERC should be given the power to establish binding guidelines
for recovery of investments in multijurisdiction plants. The analysis of
rate treatment of canceled plants and excess capacity earlier in this Ar-
ticle indicates the nature of the appropriate ratemaking guidelines." 8
In the case of canceled plants, each participating utility should be al-
lowed to recover its investment subject to a penalty for any error in
forecasting. The penalty should take the form of a disallowance of a
portion of the utility's cost of capital associated with its investment in
the plant. Where the plant creates undesirable excess capacity for some
of the participating utilities, each such utility should be allowed to re-
cover its investment in the plant subject to a financial penalty in the
form of a reduction of the utility's allowed rate of return proportionate
to the amount of undesirable excess capacity on the utility's system re-
sulting from its participation in the plant.
2 7
1
A FERC guideline on recovery of investments in canceled mul-
tijurisdiction plants would be relatively easy to draft and implement.
Indeed, FERC's present policy could provide a starting point for devel-
oping such a guideline.280 Drafting an appropriate guideline for the
11 See generally supra text accompanying notes 135-60.
27 See supra text accompanying notes 84-134.
179 See supra text accompanying notes 221-25.
'80 In a case arising out of the cancellation of the Tyrone generating plant, FERC
policy was described. After allocating the costs of cancellation among the parties in the
manner prescribed by the parties' agreement, FERC allocated the "carrying costs ac-
cruing prior to abandonment to the ratepayers and those pertaining to the amortization
period to the utility." South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FERC, 690 F.2d 674, 677
(8th Cir. 1982). FERC also adopted a "variable amortization period targeted at ten
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rate treatment of excess capacity resulting from participation in a mul-
tijurisdiction plant would present a considerable challenge, however.
The excess capacity determination requires a detailed analysis of facts
uniquely accessible to utilities and the state commissions that regulate
them.2"' Thus, any guideline for the rate treatment of excess capacity
should allocate to each state commission the primary responsibility for
finding the many facts that are necessary for a proper rate determina-
tion. Yet, predictable and uniform rate treatment of excess capacity re-
sulting from participation in multijurisdiction plants is critical to the
viability of the multijurisdiction option. Therefore, the FERO excess
capacity guideline should treat in detail such issues as the appropriate
definition of excess capacity in this context and the permissible finan-
cial penalty corresponding to a range of potential amounts of excess
capacity.
Finally, the system for regulating multijurisdiction plants should
allow all affected parties-states, sponsors and potential investors-to
know the rules applicable to the plant at the time each makes its deci-
sion to participate in the plant. Thus, the federal guidelines should be
established prior to the decision of each party to participate in a plant
and should be binding on the parties for the life of the plant. FERC
should have the power to change the guidelines based on experience
with the prior guidelines, but any such change should be applicable
only to plants initiated after the change.
It is difficult to be confident that such a revolutionary proposal
would function well. Even if this proposal or some variation would per-
mit effective regulation of multijurisdiction plants, there is absolutely
no reason to expect Congress to enact legislation creating such a regula-
years." Id.
The FERO opinion reasoned:
We think it entirely appropriate to allocate the carrying costs accru-
ing prior to abandonment to the ratepayers and those pertaining to the
amortization period to the utility. Prior to when a project is abandoned, it
is clear that the carrying costs on investment are as much a legitimate
expense of the project as are the more tangible costs such as parts and
materials. After abandonment, all prudent expenses associated with the
project, regardless of their nature, can be calculated and amortized in cost-
of-service. The carrying costs which arise during the amortization period,
however, are not, properly viewed, related to the project, but are part of
the utility's overall financing costs.... Were we to. . .require the share-
holder to shoulder part of the AFDUC, it is clear that the risk of investing
in electric utilities would be increased and the cost of capital would in-
crease to the extent necessary to compensate for the additional risk.
Northern States Power Co., [1979-1982 Transfer Binder] UTL. L. REP. 12,516, at
15,987 (F.E.R.C. 1981).
281 See Franklin, supra note 175, at 17.
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tory system. Only two conclusions can be drawn today with confidence.
First, the multijurisdiction plant option can save the electricity industry
and consumers of electricity billions of dollars. Second, the multijuris-
diction plant option will not remain viable without major changes in
regulatory control of multijurisdiction plants.
V. SUMMARY AND POSTSCRIPT
The five major regulatory dilemmas that arise repeatedly with re-
spect to new plants proposed by individual utilities are certification,
cancellation, rate treatment of investments in canceled plants, rate
treatment of completed plants that result in uneconomic levels of excess
capacity, and regulatory power over multijurisdiction plants. These
regulatory questions are interrelated and are critically important to the
creation of appropriate incentives to invest in new plants and to com-
plete or to cancel partially completed plants. Moreover, the very com-
plexity of the questions and the difficulty of resolving them in a coher-
ent fashion suggests the need for a reevaluation of the regulatory
process itself.
Some commissions have the power to certify new plants; some do
not. The presence or absence of certification power may have important
legal implications for the rate treatment of completed or canceled
plants, but the overall operation of the regulatory system is affected
very little by the existence of certification powers. The resources availa-
ble to state commissions are simply inadequate to expect them to con-
duct reliable forecasts of market conditions twelve to fourteen years in
the future. Thus, state commissions should not be expected to exercise
certification power in a manner that effectively limits the ability of util-
ities to respond to the regulatory incentive to overinvest in capital
assets.
Most commissions that have certification power also have the
power to order cancellation of a previously certified plant. In some
cases, however, courts have greatly limited the power of a commission
to cancel a certified plant because of the potentially adverse financial
effects of cancellation on the utility. Any commission with certification
power should also have cancellation power. The cancellation decision
requires the same analytical process as the certification decision. Rate-
payers will sometimes benefit from the cancellation of a partially com-
pleted plant based on changed circumstances even if they have to pay
higher rates to allow the utility to recover its investment in the canceled
plant. Concern about the potential financial implications of cancellation
on the utility can be met through judicial review of the commission's
rate treatment of the utility's investment in the canceled plant. A com-
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mission decision disallowing the utility's investment in the plant can be
reversed as an abuse of discretion or, if such rate treatment is required
by statute, as an unconstitutional taking of property without just
compensation.
State commissions frequently must determine the appropriate rate
treatment of utility investments in plants whose completion creates ex-
cess capacity because of differences between forecast and actual market
conditions. Treatment of such excess capacity cases varies greatly
among commissions. Most commissions include all excess capacity in
rate base, but a few exclude investments in plants that result in excess
capacity, and others attach a more modest financial penalty to excess
capacity through some other means. Both total inclusion and total ex-
clusion, however, have critical defects. Inclusion of all excess capacity
in rate base fails to provide any check on the regulatory incentive to
overinvest in capital assets. In some circumstances, this rate treatment
also creates an incentive to complete plants when changed conditions
make completion uneconomic. Thus, inclusion of all excess capacity in
rate base is unsound as a matter of policy. Excluding all excess capacity
from rate base is equally bad from a policy perspective because it cre-
ates a powerful incentive to underinvest in capacity and, in some cir-
cumstances, it also creates an incentive to cancel plants that should be
completed even if excess capacity results from the completion. The opti-
mum regulatory treatment of excess capacity would impose a financial
penalty on excess capacity precisely equal to the regulatory incentive to
overinvest in capacity. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine the
magnitude of a regulated utility's incentive to overinvest.28 2 The Iowa
Commission's rate treatment 2 3 of excess capacity provides the most
promising approach to the problem. By reducing a utility's rate of re-
turn by an amount proportionate to the amount of uneconomic excess
capacity on the utility's system,284 the Iowa Commission assesses a fi-
nancial penalty that may be a reasonably accurate approximation of the
penalty necessary to offset the regulatory incentive to overinvest.
State commissions also must determine the proper rate treatment
of canceled plants. A few commissions allow utilities to recover through
multi-year amortization their complete investment in a canceled plant,
including all cost of capital associated with that investment. Most com-
missions permit recovery of the out-of-pocket costs of the investment
but exclude all or a portion of the utility's associated cost of capital.
Depending on the length of the amortization period, this typical policy
212 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
283 See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
284 See supra note 222.
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allocates a high proportion of the cost of the canceled plant to the util-
ity. A growing minority of commissions allow no recovery of any por-
tion of a utility's investment in canceled plants. Allowing full recovery
of investments in canceled plants, including full recovery of the related
cost of capital, is a poor choice from the perspective of public policy
because it does not limit the ability of a utility to respond to the regula-
tory incentive to overinvest. In some circumstances, it also creates an
incentive to cancel plants that should be completed. On the other hand,
disallowing all investment in canceled plants is an even worse policy
choice because it creates an incentive to underinvest in capacity and, in
some circumstances, an incentive to complete plants that should be can-
celed. Again, the optimal solution is to attach a financial penalty to
plant cancellation that is precisely equivalent to both the regulatory in-
centive to overinvest and to the financial penalty for excess capacity.
Despite the uncertain quantum of the incentive to overinvest, commis-
sions that permit recovery of the out-of-pocket costs of investments in
canceled plants but preclude recovery of a portion of the associated cost
of capital may be imposing a penalty that is a reasonable approxima-
tion of the optimal penalty for forecasting errors that result in cancella-
tion of partially completed plants.
Regulatory disputes concerning multijurisdiction plants present
policy issues that are particularly important and particularly difficult to
resolve. Under the present regulatory system, state commissions have no
control over the rate implications of multijurisdiction plants whose cost
and capacity are allocated contractually. At present, FERC has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over such rates and frequently applies policies that re-
quire consumers to bear both the full cost of participation in multijuris-
diction plants that create excess capacity and a high proportion of the
cost of plants that are canceled. FERC's approach encourages utilities
to sponsor multijurisdiction plants. At the same time, however, present
regulatory treatment creates an incentive for states to prevent their util-
ities from participating in multijurisdiction plants. States have the
power to forbid their utilities from executing contracts to participate in
multijurisdiction plants, and many states can be expected to exercise
this power in the future. Thus, the present allocation of regulatory
power over multijurisdiction plants threatens the very viability of the
option. This is extremely unfortunate because the multijurisdiction
plant option has the potential to reduce the total cost of providing elec-
tric service by many billions of dollars.
Solutions to the multijurisdiction plant problem are hard to find.
The two easiest solutions-increased or decreased federal preemption of
state regulatory power over multijurisdiction plants-do not seem
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promising. The first is not only politically unrealistic, but also merely
shifts the ability to make mistakes from state commissions to FERC. 285
The second alternative would create regulatory risks so great that utili-
ties would not be willing to participate in multijurisdiction plants.28 6 It
appears that the difficult regulatory questions posed by multijurisdic-
tion plants will not be resolved simply by a difference in FERC or state
policies. Rather, the valuable multijurisdiction plant option will be via-
ble only if Congress passes legislation creating a complicated new regu-
latory system for multijurisdiction plants that reallocates regulatory
power between federal and state commissions in a manner never previ-
ously attempted.
Several broader inferences can be drawn from the foregoing analy-
sis of specific regulatory problems. First, the present regulatory system
functions poorly. Regulated utilities apparently have responded to the
artificial regulatory incentive to overinvest in capital assets. These past
investment decisions are costing consumers tens of billions of dollars.
Generally, regulators have reacted either by allowing utilities to profit
from their erroneous investment decisions or by imposing sanctions on
investment decisions so draconian that the artificial regulatory incentive
to overinvest in capacity has been replaced in some jurisdictions by an
even more powerful regulatory incentive to underinvest. In addition,
some commissions have chosen a combination of regulatory policies that
creates incentives to cancel partially completed plants that should be
completed, while other commissions have chosen policies that create in-
centives to complete plants that should be canceled. At the same time,
the tension between federal and state regulation may eliminate one of
the most promising approaches to investing in new capacity: jointly
sponsored multijurisdiction plants.
Second, while it is relatively easy to identify examples of clearly
erroneous regulatory policies, it is far more difficult to devise policies
that will remove all regulatory sources of distortion from critical deci-
sions such as whether and when to build a new plant, what type and
size plant to build, and whether to cancel or complete a partially com-
pleted plant. Similarly, a reallocation of regulatory jurisdiction over
multijurisdiction plants that will retain the viability of this efficient
method of adding generating capacity would be cumbersome and would
require a large intrusion of federal power into areas of traditional state
concern. The primary goal of this Article has been to suggest policies
that will improve to some extent the performance of the electricity in-
285 See supra text accompanying notes 262-64.
286 See supra text accompanying notes 264-66.
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dustry. The policies proposed would accomplish that modest goal. It is
highly unlikely, however, that the gradual alteration of regulatory pol-
icy will eliminate what appear to be substantial distortions of invest-
ment incentives inherent in the current method of regulating the elec-
tricity industry. The root of the problem of mistakes in retrospect lies
in the nature of regulation itself. Despite the pessimistic conclusions
reached in recent studies of the feasibility of deregulation of electric
generation,2 87 researchers should continue the search for ways to
achieve this goal. The very difficulty of finding correct regulatory re-
sponses to the problem of mistakes in retrospect suggests that the regu-
latory system itself is ill-suited to meet the needs of the electricity in-
dustry. Deregulation would eliminate the gross distortion of investment
decisions that is inherent in the present regulatory system. It is hard to
quarrel with advice to be cautious when confronted with the major un-
certainties of deregulation of electric generation. It may well be, how-
ever, that deregulation would not produce an industry that performs as
poorly as the present heavily regulated electricity industry. The costs of
continued regulation of electricity generation are so great that policy-
makers at least should take the initial experimental steps toward dereg-
ulation that even those pessimistic about the benefits of deregulation
recommend.2"'
28 The latest and most comprehensive study of deregulation of the electricity in-
dustry was completed by Paul Joskow and Richard Schmalensee last year. P.L. Jos-
KOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICAL
UTILITY DEREGULATION (1983). Their painstaking analysis of four possible ap-
proaches to deregulation-complete deregulation, deregulation of wholesale transac-
tions, separation of distribution and deregulation of wholesale power transactions, and
complete vertical disintegration and deregulation of wholesale power transac-
tions-identified the many uncertainties and potentially serious drawbacks in a deregu-
lated industry. Id. at 118-254. As a result, they recommended that government respond
with skepticism to the many proposals made for deregulation. Id. at 249-51, 252-59.
This Article suggests, however, that Joskow and Schmalensee may have underesti-
mated the magnitude of the regulatory distortion to which the electricity industry is
subject. They focused their attention on distortions created by irrational retail rate de-
signs. Id. at 7, 79-90. They concluded that immediate deregulation would be neither
economically efficient nor politically feasible and that the industry could never be en-
tirely deregulated. They found that "deregulation is not likely to improve significantly
the efficiency properties of retail rate standards." Distortion could be eliminated
through changes in retail rate design consistent with continued regulation of electric
generation. Id. at 183-89. Conceding this important point, however, deregulation still
has the potential to eliminate other sources of distortion that are far more harmful than
irrational rate design.
28 Id. at 252-59; see also Meyer, A Modest Proposal for the Partial Deregulation
of Electric Utilities, 111 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 14, 1983, at 23.
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